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MONITORING E-MAIL OF EMPLOYEES IN THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR: A COMPARISON BETWEEN 
WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
YOHEI SUDA* 
Abstract: Both Western Europe and the United States limit e-mail 
monitoring by an employer in the workplace and protect employee 
privacy. Nevertheless, cases from both Western Europe and the United 
States show that these regions allow an employer broad rights to monitor 
employee e-mail. A new case from France, however, demonstrates that 
Western Europe is increasingly likely to protect employee privacy in the 
workplace by limiting e-mail monitoring by private-sector employers. 
Conversely, little is expected to change in the United States, despite recent 
corporate scandals, because the role of government and the value placed 
on the right to privacy diverges in the United States from that of Western 
Europe. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Employee communication in the workplace is increasingly under 
employer surveillance.1 According to a recent survey in the United States, 
forty-seven percent of large and mid-sized organizations monitor 
employee e-mail messages, and sixty-three percent monitor their Internet 
use.2 Another survey in the United Kingdom revealed that up to eighty-
four percent of businesses monitor employee communication.3 
 * Law Clerk for the Honorable Barbara A. Madsen of the Washington State Supreme Court 
(2003–2004); Maîtrise (2003), Université de Nantes; J.D. (2002), University of Washington; LL.B. 
(1999), University of Tokyo. The author would like to thank Professors Patrick Chaumette, 
Christopher Docksey, Karen Williams, Walter Walsh, and Joel Reidenberg for their kind guidance and 
suggestions. This Article reflects only the author’s personal view and in no way implicates the view of 
the Washington State Supreme Court. 
 1. Michael Osterman, Employee E-mail Surveillance, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, at 
http://www.nwfusion.com/newsletters/gwm/2000/1204gw1.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). The 
storage and review of employee e-mail messages has increased dramatically since 1997. According to 
one survey, 14.9% of organizations conducted reviews of employee e-mail messages in 1997, “while 
the 2000 survey reveal[ed] that 38.1% of organizations [did] so.” Id. 
 2. American Management Association, More Companies Watching Employees, American 
Management Association Annual Survey Reports, at http://www.amanet.org/press/amanews/ 
ems2001.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter AMA Reports]. This survey is based on the 
answers of 1,627 respondents, many of whom are large companies in the United States. Thus, these 
results reflect the trend in large U.S. companies. According to this survey, 77.7% of employers 
actively monitor some form of employee communication, including voice mail and telephone 
conversations. See American Management Association, 2001 AMA Survey, Workplace Monitoring & 
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In some cases, the result of such surveillance is serious. In November 
1999, The New York Times fired twenty-three employees for allegedly 
distributing offensive jokes on the company’s computer system.4 Xerox 
fired forty employees for violations of the company’s e-mail policy.5 In 
fact, more than a quarter of large- and mid-sized companies have fired 
employees for the misuse of office e-mail and Internet services.6 
When an employer monitors employee e-mail, there is a conflict 
between employer and employee interests. On the one hand, an employer 
has varied and legitimate interests in monitoring employee e-mail. First, 
they have an interest in preventing viruses and hackers from penetrating 
the office computers and servers.7 An employer also has legitimate 
interests in preventing employees from disseminating trade secrets, 
sending e-mail that can provoke lawsuits, and reducing their productivity.8 
Surveillance: Policies and Practices, Summary of Key Findings, available at http://www.amanet.org/ 
research/pdfs/emsfu_short.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter AMA Survey]. 
 3. Matthew Glynn, When E-mail Must Remain Private: Data Protection: Companies Can 
Monitor Employees’ Messages. But They Must Be Careful, Says Matthew Glynn, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
June 4, 2001, at 13, available at 2001 WL 25827450. 
 4. Thomas York, Invasion of Privacy? E-mail Monitoring Is On The Rise: Businesses Can—and 
DO—Monitor Messages to Avoid Legal and Technical Problems, INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 21, 2001, 
at http://www.informationweek.com/774/pre-mail.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). The New York 
Times found the messages, which it considered obscene, through an investigation of an employee’s use 
of company stationery to obtain unemployment benefits for a friend. See Lisa Guernsey, Management: 
You’ve Got Inappropriate Mail; Monitoring of Office E-Mail Is Increasing, at 
http://www.somansa.com/english/abou_press.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 5. Maura Kelly, Your Boss May Be Monitoring Your E-mail, SALON.COM, Dec. 8, 1999, at 
http://dir.salon.com/tech/feature/1999/12/08/e-mail_monitoring/index.html?sid=497303 (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2005). 
 6. “More than a quarter of surveyed companies (27%) say that they have fired employees for 
misuse of office e-mail or Internet connections, and nearly two-thirds (65%) report some disciplinary 
measure for those offenses.” AMA Reports, supra note 2. 
 7. MATTHEW DANDA, LA SECURITE SUR LE WEB 16–17 (2001). This is mostly the task of a 
webmaster appointed by an employer. However, scholars and practitioners seem to prefer the 
expression “monitoring by an employer.” This Article reflects this preference. 
 8. See Dana Hawkins, Lawsuits Spur Rise in Employee Monitoring, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Aug. 13, 2001, at 53, available at 2001 WL 30365775; David Russell, One-Third of U.S. 
Workers Have Web Use Monitored, TORONTO STAR, July 11, 2001, at E05, available at 2001 WL 
23661745. Cf. Press Release, Websense, Employee Internet Misuse a $63 Billion Problem for 
Corporate America, Reports Websense Inc.: Misuse May Affect U.S. Productivity Overall, Which 
Recently Hit Eight-Year Low (Aug. 1, 2001), at http://www.websense.com/company/news/pr/ 
Display.php?Release=010801355 (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) (pointing out that employees’ Internet 
use for non-work-related websites is responsible for low work productivity). The survey by the 
American Management Association showed that legal liability, security concerns, and productivity 
measurement are the top three rationales for electronic monitoring and surveillance. According to the 
survey, legal liability was the most important rationale, with a rating of 5.89 on a scale from one, as 
the lowest or least important, to seven, as the highest or most important rating. Security concerns were 
the second most important rationale, with a rating of 5.65, followed by productivity, with a rating of 
5.06. Among those companies that brought legal actions concerning employee e-mail and Internet use, 
legal liability’s rating increased to 6.30. See AMA Survey, supra note 2. 
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On the other hand, monitoring employee e-mail inevitably compromises 
employee privacy in the workplace. Because employees tend to send 
personal e-mail from work, particularly outside work hours, monitoring 
provides an employer with access to personal matters.  
This conflict between employer and employee interests is not new. The 
employer who opened a letter addressed to her employee or who 
monitored an employee’s telephone conversation raised the same issues. It 
is important, however, to consider the conflict in the context of e-mail 
monitoring because it has become significantly easier for employers to 
monitor employee e-mail in the workplace as enabling technology has 
advanced and become available at a lower cost.9 
In 1989, the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation to further 
the protection of employee privacy in the workplace.10 Additionally, on 
October 24, 1995, the European Union adopted Directive 95/46/EC on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data.11 Directive 95/46 creates a 
 9. See generally S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private Distinction: Employee 
Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 826–27 (1998) (“[t]he technology allows 
surreptitious and continuous surveillance”); Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: 
Electric Mail Monitoring in the Private-sector Workplace, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 345, 345 (1995) 
(“[T]he current widespread development of sophisticated technology is greatly expanding the 
advanced and highly effective methods by which employers monitor the workplace.”). “American 
workers are coming under scrutiny via technology such as e-mail scanning software and satellite 
tracking devices.” Tammy Joyner, Atlanta-Area Employees Chafe at Employers’ New Monitoring 
Systems, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, July 25, 2001, at 01, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, Atlanta Journal-Constitution File. “Such monitoring through video equipment, point of sale 
technologies, computer terminals, magnetic ‘active’ badges pen registers, telephone recording devices 
and numerical control machines now allows access to most, if not all, employee conversations and e-
mail, and in many cases can record each movement or keystroke of an employee.” Lawrence E. 
Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 379, 379 (2000). “Sales of employee-monitoring software are worth about $140 million a 
year, a return to the vendor of only a few dollars per covered employee: on average, only about $5.25 
per monitored employee per year (and as little as $4 per employee, when the non-monitoring uses of 
these products, such as filtering for spam or viruses, are included). Even considering reseller discounts 
and hardware costs, a large organization may end up paying less than $10 per year per monitored 
employee. For example, the U.S. Army recently purchased a 200,000-seat installation from Websense; 
including hardware, the total cost was $1.8 million, or only about $9 per employee.” Andrew 
Schulman, The Extent of Systematic Monitoring of Employee E-mail and Internet Use, SONIC.NET, 
July 9, 2001, at http://www.sonic.net/~undoc/extent.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 10. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Recommendation of the Comm. of Ministers to Member States on the 
Protection of Personal Data Used for Employment Purposes, Recommendation No. R (89) 2 (1989), 
available at https://wcm.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=710373&Lang=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) 
[hereinafter Council of Europe Recommendation]. It is important to keep in mind that the Council of 
Europe and the European Union are separate bodies. 
 11. Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data,1995 O.J. (L 281), available 
at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc 
=31995L0046&model=guichett (last visited Nov. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Directive 95/46]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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comprehensive legal scheme designed to protect citizens’ privacy against 
private parties.12 However, the right to privacy protected by the Directive 
has some exceptions.13 For example, case law addressing private-sector 
employee surveillance does not appear to favor employee privacy. 
In the United States, federal legislation as well as state statutes and 
common law regulate employer monitoring of employee e-mail.14 
However, these laws do not sufficiently protect employee privacy, and 
exceptions to federal legislation undermine its protection. Moreover, a 
common-law action for invasion of privacy against a private party, such as 
an employer, is difficult to establish in state court. And actions under both 
state and federal statutes have problems similar to those brought under the 
common law. 
Recent events, however, may change the landscape of this issue. On 
October 2, 2001, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation), France’s 
highest court, rendered a judgment that severely restricted an employer’s 
right to monitor their employees’ e-mail. And in the United States, a series 
of corporate scandals raised the serious issue of an employer’s ability to 
manage the day-to-day functioning of a corporation. 
This Article demonstrates that the level of protection currently given to 
employee e-mail in the private-sector is similar in Western Europe and in 
the United States, though Western Europe appears to provide greater 
protection. On the other hand, this Article argues the judgment of the Cour 
de cassation in Nikon France v. Odof indicates that Western Europe, 
unlike the United States, will likely increase the level of privacy protection 
afforded employee e-mail.15  
The right to privacy enjoys a higher status in Western Europe than in 
the United States. Additionally, while in Western Europe the government 
plays an active role in protecting citizens’ rights, there is a traditional 
skepticism toward government in the United States. Thus, governments in 
Western Europe can more easily intervene in an issue between two private 
parties in order to protect employee privacy and limit e-mail monitoring 
by an employer. On the other hand, the U.S. government is not likely to 
 12. The European Commission, Data Protection, Jan. 10, 2005, at http://www.europa.eu.int/ 
comm/internal_market/privacy/index_en.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). 
 13. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 2. See also Andrew Charlesworth, Data Privacy 
in Cyberspace: Not National vs. International but Commercial vs. Individual, in LAW & INTERNET: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 89–90 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2d ed. 
2000). 
 14. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2000) (Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and 
Interception of Oral Communications). 
 15. See infra note 302. 
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limit such monitoring because private parties in the United States largely 
do not trust the government to intervene. 
Part II of the Article presents the scheme of employee-privacy 
protection in the context of e-mail monitoring by an employer in Western 
Europe. It posits that while Directive 95/46 and other instruments attempt 
to protect employee privacy, the jurisprudence seems to undermine that 
protection. Part III of the Article describes the scheme of employee 
privacy protection in the context of e-mail monitoring by an employer in 
the United States. It compares the United States scheme with its European 
counterpart and concludes that the level of employee privacy protection is 
similarly low in both Western Europe and the United States.  
Part IV of the Article considers the factors that are likely to determine 
the future of employee privacy protection. After describing the value of 
the right to privacy and the role of the government in the United States and 
Western Europe, it theorizes as to the future of employee privacy 
protection in the private sector in both regions based on these factors, and 
based on recent events in France and the United States. 
II. APPROACH OF WESTERN EUROPE 
The constitutions of Western Europe protect a private person from the 
government, but not from another private person.16 Thus, various legal 
instruments that deal with data protection17 in the private sector, including 
Directive 95/46, are important sources for analyzing employer monitoring 
of employee e-mail in the private sector. Case law addressing privacy 
issues in the workplace is helpful as well. However, while various legal 
instruments attempt to increase employee data protection, case law does 
not reflect this attitude. 
A. Historical Development of Data Protection Law in Western Europe 
Western European countries began to adopt national laws on privacy 
when faced with the technological development of the 1960s.18 Sweden 
 16. Cf. Manfred Weiss & Barbara Geck, Worker Privacy in Germany, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 75, 
75–76 (1995–96). 
 17. In Europe, the term designating information privacy is “data protection.” Data protection 
refers to policies designed to regulate the collection, storage, use, or dissemination of personal 
information. This term is a translation of a German word Datenschultz. Patrick J. Murray, The 
Adequacy Standard under Directive 95/46/EC: Does U.S. Data Protection Meet This Standard?, 21 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 932, 942 (1998). 
 18. COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 12–14 (1992). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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adopted the first national data protection law in 1973.19 Germany adopted 
a federal data protection law in 1977,20 and France followed in 1978.21 
These European data protection laws covered both the public and private 
sectors22 and regulated a wide range of activities, “including data 
collection, storage, use, and dissemination.”23 Moreover, they typically set 
up a third-party board to control the flow of data.24 
However, these laws differed from one another in significant respects. 
In Sweden and France, for example, the laws gave the national data boards 
“sweeping authority to grant or deny authorization for public and private 
data processing.”25 Conversely, the national data board in Germany lacks 
the authority to issue binding opinions and has only an advisory function.26 
 19. Data Act of 1973 (as amended with effect from Jan. 1, 1989) (Swed.), 
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/dp/material/dataact.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Swedish 
Data Act of 1973]. See also FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 32 (1997) [hereinafter 
CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE]; DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES 93 (1989) (presenting a detailed explanation of the background, contents, 
and problems of the Data Act of 1973). 
 20. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], v.27.1.1977 (BGBl. I, S. 201) 
[hereinafter 1977 BDSG]. The starting point of data protection in Germany was the Data Privacy Act, 
enacted by the State of Hesse in 1970, which preceded the Swedish data protection law. The German 
law was enacted as a response to concerns about the social implications of automated data processing 
in the public administration. However, it took seven years from the time of the enactment of the 
Hessen Data Privacy Act for the German government to enact a federal data protection law. There are 
several reasons why the process took so long. First, the regulation of data transfers within the federal 
government and the need for an independent supervisory agent were issues that had to be faced; 
second, the computer industry “won an extension of the law to manual files on individuals that are 
readily accessible for repeated uses”; third, there were “contention[s] from a variety of sectors that 
provisions in various special laws already offered a great deal of data protection and that no further 
external regulation or supervision was required.” FLAHERTY, supra note 19, at 21–22, 24. 
 21. Law No. 78-17 on Informatics and Freedoms of Jan. 6, 1978, J.O., Jan. 6, 1978, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/PPEAU.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) [hereinafter 
French Data Protection Law of 1978]. By 1997, all the member states of the European Union except 
Greece had broad privacy or data protection statutes. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 
supra note 19, at 32. 
 22. See Kristie A. Deyerle, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer Dream, Employee 
Nightmare—Legislative Regulation in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 18 
COMP. LAB. L.J. 547, 591 (1997) (discussing the 1977 BDSG). See also FLAHERTY, supra note 19, at 
94, 95, 169 (explaining that the Swedish model covering both public and private-sectors had an 
influence on the French Data Protection Law of 1978). 
 23. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 32. 
 24. In Germany, the federal law created an independent Data Protection Commissioner (DPC), 
who, by advising the federal government and individual ministers, ensured that the 1977 BDSG was 
implemented. See FLAHERTY, supra note 19, at 21. In Sweden, the Swedish Data Act of 1973 instructs 
the Data Inspection Board (DIB) to pay special attention to the nature and quantity of the personal data 
being collected, how and from whom the data is being acquired, and the attitudes of the data subjects. 
Id. at 93. France created the National Commission on Informatics and Freedoms (CNIL) to implement 
the French Data Protection Law of 1978. CNIL makes decisions on the authorization of particular 
information systems in response to requests from both the public and private-sectors. Id. at 165. 
 25. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 33. See generally FLAHERTY, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/3
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While these national laws contributed to data protection in the private-
sector, they risked compromising the free flow of data because they 
established sometimes conflicting regimes for data protection in the 
various states. For example, Sweden refused to recognize a British 
corporation contract for the manufacture of a card with a magnetic strip 
capable of storing data, because Sweden believed British law did not 
sufficiently protect privacy.27 Given the increase in the transnational flow 
of personal data in the 1970s that created greater interdependence among 
European countries, Sweden’s refusal demonstrated a serious problem. As 
a result, Western Europe faced the difficult task of harmonizing personal 
data legislation. 
In the early 1980s, two major multinational data protection agreements 
attempted to harmonize these disparate national laws.28 In 1980, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
adopted the Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data.29 One year later, the Council of 
Europe promulgated the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.30 Both the OECD 
Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention define “personal data” 
broadly as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual.”31 “Data controller” in the OECD Guidelines and “controller of 
the file” in the Council of Europe Convention cover a broad range of 
parties as well.32 Both explicitly cover public and private sectors33 and set 
supra note 19, at 112–25 (discussing the powers of the DIB). 
 26. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 33; BENNETT, supra note 18, at 
182. See generally FLAHERTY, supra note 19, at 40–47 (discussing the powers of the DPC). 
 27. Solveig Singleton, Privacy and Human Rights: Comparing the United States to Europe, 
CATO INSTITUTE, Dec. 1, 1999, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/991201paper.html (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2004). 
 28. MURRAY, supra note 17, at 951–52. 
 29. OECD, The Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_ 
34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]. 
 30. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/ 
Treaties/Html/108.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Council of Europe Convention].  
 31. OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 1(b). See also Council of Europe Convention, supra 
note 30, art. 2. 
 32. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 1(a). Under the OECD Guidelines, “data 
controller” means a party who, according to domestic law, is competent to decide about the contents 
and use of personal data regardless of whether such data are collected, stored, processed or 
disseminated by that party or by an agent on its behalf. See also Council of Europe Convention, supra 
note 30, art. 2. Under the Council of Europe Convention, “controller of the file” means the natural or 
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body who is competent according to the national 
law to decide what should be the purpose of the automated data file, which categories of personal data 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p209 Suda article book pages.doc 4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
forth policies on data collection, use, storage, and transmission, as well as 
with regard to the dissemination of personal information.34 
However, the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention 
failed to harmonize divergent national data protection laws in Europe 
because they permitted broad variation in national implementation.35 First, 
the former required only voluntary adherence.36 Conversely, the latter, 
with a greater focus on the importance of data protection to the right of 
privacy, established a minimum level of protection that signatories had to 
implement.37 Unfortunately, this minimum level of protection did not 
should be stored, and which operations should be applied to them. Id. 
 33. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 2; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 30, 
art. 3, para. 1. 
 34. Joel R. Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transnational 
Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S145 (1992); Michael P. Roch, Filling the Void of 
Data Protection in the United States: Following the European Example, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 71, 74, 76 (1996). See OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, paras. 7–19. The OECD Guidelines put a 
limitation on the collection of personal data and the method of such collection, and provide that 
personal data should be relevant to the purpose for which they are to be used. To the extent that data 
collection is necessary for those purposes, it should be accurate, complete and up-to-date. Under the 
OECD Guidelines, the purpose of data collection must be specified and such specification is binding. 
Personal data should not be disclosed unless there is consent or authority of law. See also Council of 
Europe Convention, supra note 30, art. 5. 
Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be: 
(a) obtained and processed fairly and lawfully;  
(b) stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those 
purposes;  
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored;  
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date;  
(e) preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is 
required for the purpose for which those data are stored.  
Id. Additionally, both the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention give individuals 
additional safeguards, including the right to inquire what data the controller has collected regarding the 
individual, and the right to ask for correction or erasure. OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 13; 
Council of Europe Convention, supra note 30, art. 8. 
 35. Fred H. Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive, Information Privacy, and the Public 
Interest, 80 IOWA L. REV. 431–32 (1995) [hereinafter Cate, The EU Data Protection Directive]. 
 36. OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 19; see also Reidenberg, supra note 34, at S144. 
 37. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 30, art. 4.  
1. Each Party shall take the necessary measures in its domestic law to give effect to the 
basic principles for data protection set out in this chapter. 
2. These measures shall be taken at the latest at the time of entry into force of this 
convention in respect of that Party. 
Id. See also OECD Guidelines, supra note 29, para. 19. 
In implementing domestically the principles set forth in Parts Two and Three, Member 
countries should establish legal, administrative or other procedures or institutions for the 
protection of privacy and individual liberties in respect of personal data. Member countries 
should in particular endeavour to: 
(a) adopt appropriate domestic legislation; 
(b) encourage and support self-regulation, whether in the form of codes of conduct or 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/3
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harmonize national laws because the signatories set up different standards 
of data protection beyond the minimum level required by the 
Convention.38 Second, “the Council of Europe Convention did not include 
definitions for important terms, such as what constitutes an ‘adequate’ 
level of data protection”39 and, as a result, data protection laws in different 
countries had inconsistent definitions.40 Third, harmonization was 
problematic because some European countries did not even ratify the 
Council of Europe Convention and, thus, the Convention had no effect on 
their national laws.41 
In the meantime, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers 
adopted a recommendation in 198942 mandating that employee privacy be 
otherwise; 
(c) provide for reasonable means for individuals to exercise their rights; 
(d) provide for adequate sanctions and remedies in case of failures to comply with measures 
which implement the principles set forth in Parts Two and Three; and 
(e) ensure that there is no unfair discrimination against data subjects. 
Id. The OECD and the Council of Europe have different philosophies. The former is designed to foster 
economic growth among industrialized nations, while the latter’s mission is to advance human rights. 
Thus, the OECD Guidelines emphasize the importance of the free flow of information and provide for 
voluntary adherence, whereas the Council of Europe Convention stresses the need to protect 
individuals and obligates signatories to enact conforming national legislation. Reidenberg, supra note 
34, at S144. 
 38. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 35; REIDENBERG, supra note 
34, at S144 (providing examples of sensitive data, such as race, health and sexual preferences, or 
information regarding activities). The varying standards of protection reflect differing views on the 
nature of data privacy. Some countries, like Germany, France and the Nordic countries, put an 
emphasis on human rights whereas others, such as the United Kingdom, were afraid of disrupting 
international trade by setting up a standard beyond the minimum requirement of the Council of Europe 
Convention. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 85. 
 39. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 35. 
 40. Id. 
 41. By 1992, only ten countries—Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain and 
the United Kingdom (seven of twelve European Community member states as of 1992) plus Austria, 
Norway and Sweden—had ratified the Council of Europe Convention. On the other hand, eight 
countries—Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal (five of twelve European Community 
member states) plus Cyprus, Iceland and Turkey—had signed without ratification. Id. at 34, 35. 
 42. Council of Europe Recommendation, supra note 10. Article 1.1 of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation makes clear that the recommendation applies to the private and public-sectors. Id. 
art. 1.1. “Personal data” is defined similarly in the Council of Europe Convention, although there is a 
caveat that may limit the scope of personal data. Article 1.3 of the Council of Europe 
Recommendation provides: “The expression ‘personal data’ covers any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable individual. An individual shall not be regarded as ‘identifiable’ if 
identification requires an unreasonable amount of time, cost and manpower.” Id. art. 1.3. There is also 
a comprehensive definition of “employment purposes.” 
The expression “employment purposes” concerns the relations between employers and 
employees which relate to recruitment of employees, fulfilment of the contract of 
employment, management, including discharge of obligations laid down by law or laid down 
in collective agreements, as well as planning and organisation of work. 
Id. 
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safeguarded by limiting employers’ power to collect and store employee 
data.43 According to the recommendation, the data collected must be 
relevant and not excessive in light of the employer’s reasons for collecting 
it.44 The recommendation also places limits on the sources from which 
data can be monitored.45 Moreover, if the employer stores the data, it 
should be accurate, “up-to-date and represent faithfully the situation of the 
employee.”46 Additionally, the employer should not keep the data for a 
longer period than is justified by the purpose of data collection.47 
The recommendation calls for additional safeguards for the collection 
and storage of certain sensitive data and requires explicit consent where no 
domestic law safeguards exist.48 Employees (“data subjects”) have a right 
to access all data collected by the employer and to have such data rectified 
or erased when contrary to principles set out in the Recommendation.49  
Overall, while Western Europe made efforts to protect data and 
employee privacy in the private workplace, its attempts to protect data 
privacy did not assure the free flow of personal data within the region. 
B. Directive 95/46 
1. Development and Contents 
By the early 1990s, the European Commission had confirmed that it 
was necessary to harmonize the standard of data protection within 
European Community member states.50 The Commission began to regard 
the different standards afforded by member states’ data protection laws as 
 43. Id. art. 2.1. 
 44. Id. arts. 4.2, 5.1. 
 45. Employers should collect personal data from the data subject. The data subject should be 
informed when the employer collects data from sources outside the employment relationship. See id. 
art. 4.1. In the context of recruitment, employers can use outside sources only when the data subject 
gives consent or is informed in advance. See id. art. 4.3. 
 46. Id. art. 5.2. 
 47. Id. art. 14.1. 
 48. Article 10.1 of the Council of Europe Recommendation provides: 
Personal data relating to racial origin, political opinions, religious or other beliefs, sexual life 
or criminal convictions referred to in Article 6 of the Convention for the protection of 
individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data, should only be collected and 
stored in particular cases within the limits laid down by domestic law and in accordance with 
appropriate safeguards provided therein. In the absence of such safeguards, such data should 
only be collected and stored with the express and informed consent of the employees. 
Id. art. 10.1. Additionally, there are safeguards for the collection of health data. See id. arts. 0.2-10.6. 
 49. Id. art. 12.1.  
 50. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 85; CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 
19, at 35. 
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a potentially serious impediment to the implementation of its Single 
Market policy,51 which requires the free movement of persons, goods, and 
services between member states.52 Competition in the service industries of 
member states tempted those with stricter data protection laws to inhibit 
the movement of data from states with more lenient data protection laws to 
protect their own developing national industries and interests.53 
Additionally, member states with stricter data protection laws blocked the 
transfer of information to member states with more lenient laws.54 
After long negotiations, the European Parliament and the European 
Union Council adopted Directive 95/46 in October 1995 to harmonize the 
standard of data protection within European Union member states and to 
confirm the importance of data protection.55 Sweeping broadly, Directive 
95/46 declares that member states have a duty to protect fundamental 
human rights, the freedom of natural persons, and the right to privacy in 
personal data in particular.56 It pertains to “the processing of personal data 
 51. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 85. 
 52. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 9, 48, 59, amended by TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 
1992, 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]. Current provisions for freedom of goods, 
persons and services are found, respectively, in articles 23, 39 and 49. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/treaties/dat/C_2002325EN.003301.html (visited on Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
 53. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 85–86. The preamble to the Directive implies the existence 
of such a problem. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, pmbl., para. 9. 
 54. P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walls: The Impact of the European Data 
Directive on U.S. Businesses, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 275, 285 (1998); Jennifer L. Kraus, On the 
Regulation of Personal Data Flows in Europe and the United States, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 59, 
71 (1993) (stating that France did not allow the parent company of Fiat, located in France, to transmit 
employee career data to its subsidiary in Italy because Italy did not have any data protection laws and 
had not ratified the European Convention); Jennifer M. Myers, Creating Data Protection Legislation 
in the United States: An Examination of Current Legislation in the European Union, Spain, and the 
United States, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109, 123 n.97 (1997) (pointing out that France had blocked 
the transfer to Spain of personal data concerning the identities of former Spanish Civil War prisoners 
who resided in France).  
 55. The preamble of Directive 95/46 refers to the necessity of harmonization. Directive 95/46, 
supra note 11, pmbl., paras. 7–9. The first paragraph of article 1 asserts the importance of data 
protection. Id. art. 1, para. 1. The road to the Directive was long and winding. The European 
Commission issued the initial draft in 1990, but it took five years and several drafts to adopt the final 
version of the Directive. Divergent attitudes toward data protection among the member states fueled 
the lengthy negotiations. See Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 86–87; CATE, PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 35–36; Roch, supra note 34, at 79–88. 
 56. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, pmbl., paras. 10–11 & art. 1, para 1. In fact, the Directive 
tries to balance two competing values: the free flow of information and the right to privacy. Murray, 
supra note 17, at 959. The Directive provides that “Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit 
the free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the protection 
afforded under paragraph 1.” (Paragraph 1 refers to the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons). Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 1, para. 2. 
 On the other hand, paragraph 10 of the Preamble provides: 
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wholly or partly by automatic means”57 in both the public and private 
sectors.58 Directive 95/46 creates exceptions only where the relevant data 
processing lies outside the scope of European Union law, such as in public 
security and law enforcement.59 Directive 95/46 also excludes data 
processing for an individual’s purely personal or household activities from 
the reach of data monitoring.60 Such activities as the maintenance of an 
electronic personal diary or an address book with the names and telephone 
numbers of friends cannot be monitored.61 
The broad definitions of the terms “personal data” and “processing of 
personal data” indicate the far-reaching application of Directive 95/46. 
“Personal data” means “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’).”62 This definition is almost 
identical to the definition of “personal data” in the OECD Guidelines and 
the Council of Europe Convention. The definition of “processing of 
personal data” (processing) is “any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or 
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure 
Whereas the object of the national laws on the processing of personal data is to protect 
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy, which is recognized both in 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and in the general principles of Community law; whereas, for that reason, the 
approximation of those laws must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but 
must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Community; 
Directive 95/46, supra note 11, pmbl., para. 10. This paragraph prevents member states 
from sacrificing the right to privacy in order to achieve the free flow of information. 
Murray, supra note 17, at 959. 
 57. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 1. 
 58. European Commission, supra note 12. 
 59. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 2; Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 87. Public 
security and law enforcement are domains regulated by member states. See Directive 95/46, supra note 
11, art. 13. 
 60. European Commission, supra note 12; Jordan M. Blanke, “Safe Harbor” and the European 
Union’s Directive on Data Protection, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 57, 62 (2000). 
 61. Id. 
 62. “An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 2(a). This definition 
of “‘personal data’ potentially covers a wide range of types of information, including but not limited 
to, text, photographs, audiovisual images, and sound recordings of identifiable individuals.” 
Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 87. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/3
p209 Suda article book pages.doc 4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] MONITORING E-MAIL OF EMPLOYEES 221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or destruction.”63 Thus, Directive 95/46 covers every facet of personal data 
processing.64 
Directive 95/46 regulates the method of processing of personal data. 
Many of its principles follow those already set forth in the OECD 
Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention.65 Under Directive 
95/46, personal data must be “processed fairly and lawfully.”66 The 
collection of personal data must have a specified purpose that is explicit, 
legitimate, and limited by the type of data collected and the uses to which 
it will be put.67 Data must be accurate, up-to-date, adequate, relevant, and 
not excessive in relation to the purpose for which it is processed.68 Article 
7 of Directive 95/46 provides criteria for the legitimate processing of 
personal data.69 Additionally, as to sensitive personal data, such as “racial 
or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or 
sex life,” explicit consent by a data subject is required for the processing.70 
Directive 95/46 also obliges data controllers to give data subjects 
certain information, including the identity of the controller, the purposes 
of the processing, and any further information necessary to guarantee fair 
processing for the data subject.71 Additionally, Directive 95/46 gives each 
data subject the right to access their data72 and the right to object to the 
processing of their personal data.73 Finally, automated data processing 
cannot be the sole basis for decisions that significantly affect data subjects 
in most cases.74  
 63. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 2(b). 
 64. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 87. 
 65. As for the principles set forth in the OECD Guideline and the Council of Europe Convention, 
see supra notes 29, 30, 34 and accompanying text. 
 66. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 6(a). 
 67. Id. art. 6(b). 
 68. Id. arts. 6(c), 6(d). 
 69. Id. art. 7. 
 70. Id. art. 8. 
 71. Articles 10 and 11 of Directive 95/46 outline what information a data controller must give to 
a data subject. Article 10 applies when data is collected from a data subject, and article 11 applies 
when data has not been obtained from the data subject. Neither article, however, requires a data 
controller to provide such information when the data subject already has it. See id. arts. 10, 11. 
 72. Id. art. 12. This indicates that anyone is entitled to approach any data controller to inquire 
whether the controller processes personal data relating to the data subject, to receive a copy of the data, 
and if need be, to request that the data be erased. In such cases, the data subject may also require the 
data controller, where possible, to notify third parties who had previously consulted the incorrect data. 
European Commission, Data Protection, supra note 12. 
 73. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 14. The right to object includes a right to object to the 
lawful processing of one’s personal data, as well as a right to object to such processing for the purpose 
of direct marketing. Id. See also Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 87. 
 74. Decisions that significantly affect the data subject, such as the decision to grant a loan or 
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To enforce the data protection rules, Directive 95/46 obliges each 
member state to create a national supervisory authority.75 This authority 
has the power to investigate any processing of personal data that may 
affect the rights and freedoms of data subjects. They also have the power 
to order erasure of data, to require cessation of processing, and to block 
proposed transfers of data to third parties.76 A national supervisory 
authority further has the power to engage in legal proceedings when there 
is a violation of a national data protection law that implements the 
Directive.77 Additionally, Directive 95/46 has sections regarding liability, 
sanctions, and remedies in case of a violation.78 
The most controversial portion of Directive 95/46 is article 25, which 
restricts the transfer of personal data to a third country that does not have 
an adequate level of data protection.79 The evaluation of adequacy takes 
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer 
operation or set of operations.80 The United States feared that article 25 
might interrupt the free flow of information from the European Union to 
the United States, thereby hampering the ability of American companies to 
engage in trans-Atlantic transactions.81 Therefore, in 2000, the European 
issue insurance, could theoretically be made on the sole basis of automated data processing. Under the 
Directive, this can only be done in the course of entering or performing a contract. In this situation, the 
data controller must adopt suitable safeguards. For instance, the data controller could allow the data 
subject to protest if her requests are not satisfied. Other types of automated decisions might be 
authorized by statute. European Commission, Data Protection, supra note 12.  
 75. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 28, paras. 1, 2. 
 76. Id. art. 28, para. 3; CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 40. 
 77. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 28, para. 3. 
 78. Id. arts. 22–24.  
 79. Id. art. 25. 
 80. Article 25 of the Directive provides: 
The adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country shall be assessed in the 
light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer 
operations; particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country 
of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in 
question and the professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that 
country. 
Id. art. 25, para. 2. However, there are some narrow exceptions to this rule in article 26, including: 
unambiguous consent; transfer necessary for the performance of a contract where the data subject or 
her interest is involved; transfer necessary or legally required on important public interest grounds; and 
transfer necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject. Id. art. 26, para. 1. 
 81. See CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 127. For an explanation of 
why scholars believed article 25 might interrupt the free flow of information between the European 
Union and the United States, see Laura A. Bischoff, Technology Makes Gathering, Storing and 
Disseminating Personal Information about You and Your Habits Extremely Easy . . . and That’s Not 
Always Good, THE DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 6, 1999, at 1F, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
DDN File. United States Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor: Safe Harbor Overview, at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). Whether the United 
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Union and the United States agreed to create a “safe harbor” framework, 
which allows American companies to comply with the directive’s 
adequacy requirement.82 
States satisfies the adequacy requirement of the Directive is a hotly debated issue. See generally Cate, 
The EU Data Protection Directive, supra note 35, at 437–39 (casting doubts on adequacy of the 
protection of privacy in the United States); Monahan, supra note 54, at 287–93 (implying the 
inadequacy of the standard in the United States by stating that the Directive would force the United 
States to make at least some changes in its data protection law); Roch, supra note 34 (taking a position 
that the United States clearly did not meet the adequacy standard set by the Directive); Graham Pearce 
& Nicolas Platten, Orchestrating Transatlantic Approaches to Personal Data Protection: A European 
Perspective, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 2024, 2039–47 (1999); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and 
Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy 
Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22–38 (2000); Murray, supra note 17 (examining the adequacy of 
the U.S. scheme in detail and suggesting that many areas of public sector and some areas of private-
sector met the adequacy requirement while many areas of private-sector, such as health care and direct 
marketing, failed to meet the adequacy requirement). 
 82. Under the “safe harbor” framework, a company is deemed to satisfy the adequacy 
requirement of the Directive if the company satisfied the following seven principles: 
1. Notice: Organizations must notify individuals of the purposes underlying their collection 
and usage of personal data. They must provide information on how individuals can contact 
the organization with any inquiries or complaints, the types of third parties to whom it 
discloses their data, and the choices and means the organization offers for limiting the use and 
disclosure of their data. 
2. Choice: Organizations must give individuals the opportunity to choose (opt out) whether 
their personal data will be disclosed to a third party or used in a way incompatible with the 
purpose underlying its original collection or subsequent authorization by the individual. For 
sensitive information, affirmative or explicit (opt in) consent must be given for the 
information to be disclosed to a third party or used for a purpose other than its original 
purpose or a purpose authorized subsequently by the individual. 
3. Onward Transfer (Transfers to Third Parties): To disclose information to a third party, 
organizations must satisfy the notice and choice requirements. Additionally, when the third 
party transferee is acting as an agent(1), the organization may transfer the information if it 
makes sure that the third party either subscribes to the safe harbor principles or is subject to 
Directive 95/26 or another adequacy finding. Alternatively, the organization can enter into a 
written agreement with the third party requiring the third party provide at least the same level 
of privacy protection as is required by the relevant principles. 
4. Access: Individuals must have access to the personal information held by an organization 
on them. They must also be able to correct, amend, or delete that information when it is 
inaccurate. However, there are exceptions when the burden or expense of providing access 
would be disproportionate to the risks to the individual’s privacy and when granting access 
would violate the rights of persons other than the individual. 
5. Security: Organizations must take reasonable precautions to protect personal information 
from loss, misuse, unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction. 
6. Data integrity: Personal information must be relevant to the purposes for which it will be 
used. An organization should take reasonable steps to ensure that data is reliable, accurate, 
complete, and current. 
7. Enforcement: To ensure compliance with the “safe harbor” principles, there must be (a) 
readily available and affordable independent recourse mechanisms so that each individual’s 
complaints can be investigated and resolved and damages awarded where the applicable law 
or private-sector initiatives so provide; (b) procedures for verifying implementation of the 
commitments companies make to adhere to the safe harbor principles; and (c) obligations to 
remedy problems arising out of a failure to comply with the principles. Sanctions must be 
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Directive 95/46 provides that the victim of a violation of the Directive 
is entitled to compensation from the controller for damages suffered. 
However, it does not specify any criminal punishment for a violation. 
Rather, each member state must legislate sanctions, including criminal 
punishment, to address such violations.83 
As mentioned, Directive 95/46 offers a general framework for the 
protection of the right to privacy. However, whether Directive 95/46 
actually protects a data subject depends on how article 7 is interpreted. A 
broad interpretation of article 7, which sets forth justification for data 
processing, would undermine the right of a data subject to privacy. Among 
the justifications listed, article 7(f) and article 7(a) appear to be relevant in 
light of the typical motives of employers that conduct e-mail monitoring.84 
Article 7(a) plays a limited role. First, according to the provision, 
consent must be unambiguous.85 Second, “the data subject’s consent” 
under Directive 95/46 is defined as “any freely given specific and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his 
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed.”86 Under this 
definition, an employee has given consent consistent with article 2(h) and 
article 7(a) only when that employee can withdraw consent without 
prejudice.87 However, it is nearly impossible to imagine a situation where 
an employee would be able to withdraw consent without prejudice when 
sufficiently rigorous to ensure compliance by the organization. Organizations that fail to 
provide annual self-certification letters will no longer appear in the list of participants, and 
safe harbor benefits will no longer be assured. 
United States Department of Commerce, supra note 81. For an academic discussion of the “safe 
harbor” framework, see James T. Sunosky, Privacy Online: A Primer on the European Union’s 
Directive and United States’ Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 
2000, at 86–88; Jordan M. Blanke, supra note 60; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the 
United States Relating to International Law: Legal Regulation of Information, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 132, 
156–59 (2001); James M. Assey, Jr. & Demetrios A. Eleftheriou, The EU-U.S. Privacy Safe Harbor: 
Smooth Sailing or Troubled Waters?, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 145, 151–53 (2001); Anna E. 
Shimanek, Do You Want Milk with Those Cookies?: Complying with the Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 455, 471–76 (2001); Julia Gladstone, The Impact of E-Commerce in 
the Laws of Nations Article: The U.S. Privacy Balance and the European Privacy Directive: 
Reflections on the United States Privacy Policy, 7 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 10, 24–28 
(2000); Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 109–19. 
 83. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 24. 
 84. Id. arts. 7(a) and 7(f). 
 85. Id. art. 7(a). 
 86. Id. art. 2(h). 
 87. THE ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, OPINION 8/2001 ON THE PROCESSING OF THE PERSONAL 
DATA IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT 23 (2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2001/wp48en.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter 
ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY]. The Article 29 Working Party is an organization established by 
European Union Directive 95/46 designed to function as an independent advisory board relating to 
matters of data protection and privacy. Id. 
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an employer is monitoring in order to protect their own computer system, 
networks, and trade secrets.  
Article 7(f) plays a far greater role than article 7(a). According to 
article 7(f), data processing, without the unambiguous consent of the data 
subject, is possible if there are “legitimate” interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed.88 
This provision balances the interests served by the processing of data (the 
interests of employers in workplace e-mail monitoring) and the right to 
privacy (the interest of employees).89 Such a balancing test carries a risk, 
even though the data subject has a right to object to the processing of data 
under certain circumstances.90 This risk exists, in particular, in member 
states that interpret broadly the term “legitimate.”91 As the interpretation of 
this relatively new directive has not yet developed in the courts of the 
European Community, it is necessary to look at existing European case 
law. 
2. Implementation of Directive 95/46  
a. Implementation Process 
Directive 95/46 requires member states to adopt national implementing 
laws.92 Because member states may offer greater protection than the 
Directive mandates through domestic laws, standards of protection may 
differ among member states.93 Despite these differences, however, 
member states cannot limit the free flow of information to other member 
states, as this would frustrate one of the stated purposes of the Directive.94 
 88. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 7(f). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 14. 
 91. “While the operative legal concepts of article 7(a) (collection with consent) and article 7(b) 
(in preparation or performance of a contract) are fairly definite, those of article 7(f) are considerably 
more indefinite. The Directive offers scant guidance in determining what interests are legitimate under 
article 7(f) and when they might be overridden by the interests of the data subject.” James R. 
Maxeiner, Freedom of Information and the EU Data Protection Directive, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 93, 99 
(1995). A lack of clarity may allow a lenient interpretation in favor of various interests contrary to the 
right to privacy. PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA 
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 100 (1998) (stating, 
“[a]rticle 7(f) is potentially very expansive, because of the range of ‘legitimate interests’ that might 
justify processing personal information.”). Good examples of how the balancing approach can lead to 
different conclusions include Halford and Nikon France, both of which are discussed infra.  
 92. European Commission, Data Protection, supra note 12. 
 93. Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy Protection in the European Union and the 
United States, 33 IND. L. REV. 174, 191 (1999) [hereinafter Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy]. 
 94. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, pmbl., paras. 7–8. 
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The implementation process in member states has been relatively slow. 
Although Directive 95/46 entered into effect on October 25, 1998,95 only 
two member states, Greece and Italy, had implemented it by that time.96 In 
July 1999, the European Commission sent reasoned opinions to nine 
member states (France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, and Austria) for their failure to 
take all the measures necessary to implement Directive 95/46.97 Five 
member states—France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and 
Ireland—still had not finished implementing Directive 95/46 by January 
2000, when the European Commission took them to the European Court of 
Justice for this failure.98 Since that time, five states have adopted laws 
implementing the Directive.99  
 95. Press Release, European Commission, Directive on Personal Data Protection Enters into 
Effect (Oct. 23, 1998), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/98/ 
925&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
 96. Id. Member states were supposed to have implemented the Directive 95/46 by October 24, 
1998. See European Commission, Data Protection, supra note 12. 
 97. Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection: Commission Decided to Send 
Reasoned Opinions to Nine Member States (July 29, 1999), at http://europa.eu.intrapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/99/592&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
Article 226, Paragraph 1 of the E.C. Treaty provides: 
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this 
Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the 
opportunity to submit its observations. 
EC TREATY, supra note 52, art. 226, para. 1.  
 98. Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection: Commission Takes Five Member 
States to Court (Jan. 11, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/ 
10&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). 
Article 226, Paragraph 2 of the E.C. Treaty provides: If the State concerned does not comply with the 
opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice. EC TREATY, supra note 52, art. 226, para. 2.  
 99. European Commission, Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
internal_market/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Status of 
Implementation]. In the Netherlands, the Dutch parliament adopted Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens in July 2000. This law is designed to implement Directive 95/46. See Wet 
bescherming persoonsgegevens [Personal Data Protection Act], 6 juli 2000, NJ 302, available at 
http://www.justitie.nl/Images/11_5235.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). In Germany, six states 
(Brandenburg, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Hessen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, and Schleswig-Holstein) 
adopted state laws implementing Directive 95/46. At the federal level, the new version of 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz v. 23.05.2001 (BGBl.I S.904), [Federal Data Protection Act], which applies 
to both the public and private-sector, was adopted on May 18, 2001 and took effect on May 23, 2001. 
Id. Ireland enacted the Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003 on April 10, 2003 to implement 
Directive 95/46. Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003, 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.dataprivacy.ie/images/Act2003.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2004). The Data Protection 
(Amendment) Act 2003 took effect on July 1, 2003. European Commission, Status of Implementation, 
supra. In August 2004, French Parliament adopted Loi no 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative á la 
protection des personnes physiques á l’égard des traitements de données á caractére personnel et 
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b. Example of Implementation—Belgium  
In 1998, Belgium implemented Directive 95/46 by modifying its 1992 
national data protection law.100 The 1992 Belgian Data Protection Law 
applied to the automatic processing of personal data and to manually 
processed files compiled and stored in a logical manner for systematic 
consultation.101 Under this law, “automatic processing” meant any 
operation carried out wholly or in part by automatic means for recording, 
storing, modifying, erasing, consulting, or disseminating personal data.102 
The 1992 law also established basic principles to regulate personal data 
processing. For example, the law impliedly included the principle of fair 
and lawful processing of personal data.103 A data subject could request that 
data regarding them be deleted, or the subject may forbid the use of certain 
data if the data controller kept such data for a period longer than 
necessary.104 The 1992 Belgian Data Protection Law also established the 
principle that personal data may only be processed for a specified and 
legitimate purpose.105 According to la Commission de la Vie Privée 
modifiant la loi no 78–17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative á l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés in 
order to implement the Directive. Loi n 2004-801 du 6 août 2004 relative á la protection des 
personnes physiques á l’égard des traitements de données á caractére personnel et modifiant la loi 
n 78–17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative á l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés [Law No. 2004-801 of 
6 August 2004 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
Modifying Law No. 78–17 of 6 January 1978 on Data Processing, Files and Liberties], available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Waspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=JUSX0100026L (last visited Feb. 24, 
2005). In Luxembourg, Loi du 2 août 2002 relative á la protection des personnes á l’égard du 
traitement des données á caractére personnel was adopted in order to implement the Directive. Loi du 
2 août 2002 relative á proetection des personnes á l’égard du traitement des données á caractére 
personnel [Law of 2 August 2002 on the Protection of Persons with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data], available at http://www.etat.lu/memorial/memorial/a/2002/a0911308.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2005). This law took effect on December 1, 2002. European Commission, Status of 
Implementation, supra. 
 100. La Loi du 8 Décembre 1992 relative à la Protection de la Vie Privée à l’égard des 
Traitements de Données à Caractère Personnel, Modifiée par la Loi du 11 Décembre 1998 [Law of 
Dec. 8, 1992 on Privacy Protection in relation to the Processing of Personal Data, Modified by Law of 
Dec. 11, 1998], http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/icri/publications/499Consolidated_Belgian_ 
Privacylaw_v200310.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2004) [hereinafter 1998 Belgian Data Protection Law]; 
La Loi du 8 Décembre 1992 relative à la Protection des Données á Caractére Personnel [Law of Dec. 
8, 1992 on the Protection of the Processing of Personal Data], available at http://www3.dekamer.be/ 
digidoc/DPS/K2332/K23321887/K23321887.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter 1992 Belgian 
Data Protection Law]. 
 101. 1992 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100, art. 1, paras. 1–2. 
 102. Id. art. 1, para. 3. 
 103. Sophie Louveaux, Comments on the EU Data Protection Directive—The Belgian 
Perspective, 2 J.INFO. L. & TECH., May 7, 1996, at http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/dp/2louveau/ 
default.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2004). 
 104. 1992 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100, art. 12, para. 1. 
 105. Id. art. 5. 
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(Belgian Privacy Commission), whether a purpose is legitimate is 
determined by balancing interests through a process similar to the method 
found in article 7(f) of Directive 95/46.106 The Belgian law also provided 
for transparency as a major principle by requiring that the data subject be 
informed of the recording of personal data.107 
The 1998 Belgian Data Protection Law, in its amended form, closely 
followed Directive 95/46 and expanded the protections given to the data 
subject.108 First, it extended the definition of “processing” to cover data 
collection109 and made explicit the principle of fair and lawful processing 
of personal data.110 Additionally, the 1998 law accorded a data subject the 
right to object to data processing for serious and legitimate reasons.111  
C. Case Law 
As of this Article’s publication, no cases regarding employee privacy 
in the private-sector have reached the European Court of Justice, the 
judicial arm of the European Union, or the European Court of Human 
Rights, the judicial branch of the Council of Europe. However, because 
Directive 95/46 treats similarly the public and private-sectors, exploring 
cases from these courts regarding employee privacy in the public sector 
will be helpful. These cases indicate that the privacy of employees in the 
private-sector may not be protected to any great extent. 
1. Tzoanos v. Commission of the European Communities 
In Tzoanos v. Commission, the European Court of First Instance, a 
court subordinate to the European Court of Justice, took a minimalist 
approach to the right of privacy of public employees.112 While working for 
the European Commission,113 George Tzoanos used a computer owned by 
the European Commission for official purposes.114 While he was out of his 
office, European Commission officers examined the computer’s memory 
 106. Louveaux, supra note 103; see also Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 7(f). 
 107. 1992 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100, art. 9. 
 108. See generally 1998 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100; Directive 95/46, supra 
note 11. 
 109. 1998 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100, art. 1, para. 2. 
 110. Id. art. 4, para. 1, sub-para. 1; cf. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 6, para. 1(a). 
 111. 1998 Belgian Data Protection Law, supra note 100, art. 12, para. 1. Cf. Directive 95/46, 
supra note 11, art. 14. 
 112. Case T-74/96, Tzoanos v. Commission, 44 E.C.R. IA-00129, II-00343 (1998). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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and found documents that would constitute a basis for disciplinary 
action.115  
The European Court of First Instance found that the European 
Commission could examine the computer used by Tzoanos without his 
presence and use the information to commence a disciplinary action 
against him.116 To justify its conclusion, the court first pointed out that the 
European Commission had always been the computer’s owner and had 
allowed Tzoanos to use the computer exclusively for European 
Commission work.117 The court then justified its conclusion through 
reliance on the duty of European Commission employees to serve the 
interests of the European Commission.118 
2. Halford v. United Kingdom 
The European Court of Human Rights dealt with the right to privacy in 
public-sector workplaces in Halford v. United Kingdom.119 Alison Halford, 
Assistant Chief Constable with the Merseyside Police, had two telephone 
lines in her office, one of which was for private use.120 These telephones 
were outside the public network and a part of the Merseyside police 
internal telephone network.121 The Merseyside police placed no 
restrictions on the use of these telephones nor gave Halford any guidance 
on their use.122  
After being denied a promotion several times, she commenced 
proceedings in 1990 in the Industrial Tribunal for gender discrimination.123 
Thereafter, she alleged that the Merseyside police intercepted her 
telephone calls to obtain information to use against her in the 
discrimination proceeding.124 
The court rejected the government’s argument that article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Right (ECHR) did not protect telephone 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Halford v. United Kingdom, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1004 (1997). 
 120. Id. at 1009–10. 
 121. Id. at 1009–10. British law only applied to the public network. See Interception of 
Communications Act, 1985, c.56 (Eng.). Thus, the European Court of Human Rights directly applied 
article 8 of the ECHR. See Halford, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1014-20. 
 122. Id. at 1010. 
 123. Id. at 1009. 
 124. Id. at 1010. 
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calls by Halford from her office telephones because she had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy.125 In rejecting this argument, the court noted: 
There is no evidence of any warning having been given to Ms. 
Halford, as a user of the internal telecommunications system 
operated at the Merseyside police headquarters, that calls made on 
that system would be liable to interception. She would, the Court 
considers, have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such 
calls, which expectation was moreover reinforced by a number of 
factors. As Assistant Chief Constable she had sole use of her office 
where there were two telephones, one of which was specifically 
designated for her private use. Furthermore, she had been given the 
assurance, in response to a memorandum, that she could use her 
office telephones for the purposes of her sex-discrimination case 
. . . .126 
While Halford won on the specific issue of the interception of office 
telephone calls, the court’s decision did not necessarily lead to greater 
protection. The court merely held that an employer cannot monitor their 
employee’s communications without advance notice, especially when the 
employer allowed employees to use office communication systems for 
private purposes.127 This left room for a later holding that an employer 
may intercept employee communications if they give advance notice of the 
interception.128  
Thus, in light of these two cases and the failure of Directive 95/46 to 
distinguish between the public and private sectors or between business and 
non-business hours, e-mail monitoring by an employer in the private-
sector workplace may be allowed. As long as the employer gives advance 
notice of the interception to employees, neither the contents of the e-mail 
nor the time at which an employee sent the e-mail will prevent this 
monitoring.129 On the other hand, if a private-sector employer allows 
employees to send personal e-mail, this authorization will limit their 
ability to monitor employee e-mail. 
As a result, despite a comprehensive framework for data protection 
based on Directive 95/46, case law indicates that Western Europe does not 
 125. Id. at 1016. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See infra Part IV.B. 
 129. However, in France, it seems to be impossible for an employer to monitor employee e-mail 
sent during non-business hours. See infra Part IV. 
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necessarily protect the e-mail of private-sector employees against 
employer monitoring to any great extent. 
III. THE UNITED STATES 
While the U.S. Constitution protects the privacy of individuals from 
intrusions by the government, it does not protect their privacy against 
intrusions by another private person.130 Thus, an employee’s privacy is not 
constitutionally protected against intrusions by a private-sector 
employer.131 Rather, private-sector employees must base their invasion of 
privacy claims on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(ECPA),132 state statutes,133 or state common law.134 
While the ECPA sets up some privacy protection principles, it does not 
provide as much protection as Directive 95/46. Indeed the ECPA’s 
exceptions tend to swallow its protections.135 Additionally, state common 
law does not protect employees to a great extent, as in many cases it 
applies a standard arguably similar to that developed in European 
jurisprudence.136 Finally, state statutes generally have weaknesses similar 
to those of the ECPA and state common law. 
A. Historical Development of American Privacy Law in the Context of 
New Technology 
During the 1970s, when technological developments caused Western 
Europe to adopt national laws regulating privacy in the private sector, 
 130. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 92. There is an exception to this general rule when the 
actions of the nongovernmental entity can be fairly attributed to the State. Wilborn, supra note 9, at 
828; Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional 
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 306 (1995). 
 131. Wilborn, supra note 9, at 828. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government. It does not, however, necessarily apply to searches 
performed by private parties. Anne L. Lehman, E-Mail in the Workplace: Question of Privacy, 
Property or Principle?, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 99, 100–01 (1997). For example, the Supreme 
Court found in Burdeau v. McDowell that the Fourth Amendment was not intended to apply to 
searches and seizures by parties other than governmental agencies. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 
465, 475 (1921). 
 132. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat 1848, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2510, 2521, 2701–10, 3117, 3121–26 (2000) [hereinafter ECPA]. The ECPA is the only 
federal statute that specifically addresses the interception and accession of e-mail communications. 
Gantt, supra note 9, at 351. 
 133. See infra Part III.C.1. 
 134. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 135. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 136. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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governmental abuses of power preoccupied the United States.137 The U.S. 
public was concerned about the surveillance of war protestors during the 
Vietnam War138 and the abuses of wiretapping powers (leading to the 
divulsion of tax, bank, and telephone records) revealed by the Watergate 
investigation.139 
As a result of this preoccupation, the United States adopted the Privacy 
Act of 1974.140 Under the Privacy Act, no governmental agency may 
disclose to any person or another agency by any means of communication 
any record contained in a system of records without the written request or 
prior consent of a person to whom the record pertains.141 Additionally, an 
agency must keep data under its control accurate.142 Individuals may 
access the data, and they have a right to correct it.143 Finally, the Privacy 
Act requires agencies, when they collect data, to notify the individual of 
the collection and the reasons for it.144  
Combined with the Freedom of Information Act,145 the Privacy Act 
provides comprehensive information privacy in the public sector.146 
Moreover, the principles expressed in the Privacy Act mirror those 
expressed in most of the European data protection laws, including 
Directive 95/46.147 However, unlike European data protection laws, the 
Privacy Act of 1974 only applies to the public sector.148 
In the private sector, the United States has provided data protection 
through piecemeal legislation. Each act covers a specific field in the 
private sector, such as video privacy or electronic fund transfers.149 The 
ECPA is the only law not limited to a specific field.150 It is also the only 
 137. Singleton, supra note 27. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 141. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000); Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can Congress 
Protect Confidential Medical Information in the “Information Age”?, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 223, 
242 (1999).  
 142. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (2000). 
 143. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2000); Carter, supra note 141, at 242. 
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (2000); Carter, supra note 141, at 242. 
 145. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
 146. Monahan, supra note 54, at 279. 
 147. See supra Part II. 
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 149. E.g., Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000); Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6721–39, 6791–66, 
6781, 6801–09, 6821–27, 6901–10, 1681 (2000); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 12 U.S.C. 24(a), 248(b), 
1820(a), 1828, 1831, 6801 (2000); Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (§§). 
 150. The ECPA applies to the private-sector as a whole. See generally ECPA, supra note 132. 
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federal law relevant to employer monitoring of employee e-mail in the 
private sector.151  
While the U.S. Congress attempted to enact a federal law to protect an 
employee’s privacy in the private sector in both 1993 and 2000, those 
attempts failed.152 In 1993, Senator Paul Simon introduced a bill called the 
Privacy for the Consumer and Worker Act.153 This act required employers 
to clearly define their privacy policies; to refrain from monitoring personal 
communication and from video monitoring locker rooms and bathrooms; 
and to notify workers of telephone monitoring, unless it was for quality 
control.154 Congress, however, shelved the act in 1994.155  
In 2000, Congress attempted to pass the Notice of Electronic 
Monitoring Act,156 which would have required employers to give 
employees advance notice of wire or network (including e-mail) 
monitoring.157 It also would have required that notice be clear, 
conspicuous, and given annually or each time an employer’s monitoring 
policy changed.158 However, this law also did not pass.159 
B. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
In 1986, Congress adopted the ECPA by amending Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.160 Its intent was to 
address e-mail interception and access.161 The ECPA prohibits certain 
types of monitoring and provides criminal sanctions for violators in an 
effort to protect the privacy of private persons. However, as will be shown, 
the ECPA’s exceptions undermine its own privacy protections. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Workplace Privacy, Aug. 3, 2004, at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/workplace/default.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 153. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act, S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 154. Id. See also Roger Doyle, Privacy in the Workplace, 280 SCI. AM. 36 (1999), available at 
http://www.sciamarchive.org/qpdf.cfm?ArticleID_CHAR=EE1DC213-1F5E-41F3-ACDF-BE3D45F9
EED (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000, H.R. 4908, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter 
Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000]. See also Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra 
note 152. 
 157. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000, supra note 156, § 2711(a); see also Sherry L. 
Travers, Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: 1984 Revisited?, http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/ 
file/00132/004846/title/subject/topic/constitutional%20law_privacy%20rights/filename/constitutionall
aw_1_91 (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 158. Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act of 2000, supra note 156, § 2711(b). 
 159. Travers, supra note 157. 
 160. Gantt, supra note 9, at 351.  
 161. Id. 
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1. The ECPA’s Privacy Protections 
The ECPA prohibits the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications.162 The definition of “intercept” under the ECPA includes 
non-aural acquisition, as the term is defined as the “aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication 
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”163 In 
addition to interception, the ECPA prohibits breaking into an electronic 
storage system or intentionally exceeding authorized access.164 
Although not clearly stated in the text,165 the legislative history 
evidences a clear congressional intent to include e-mail within the ECPA’s 
definition of electronic communications.166 Additionally, case law 
demonstrates that the ECPA covers e-mail.167 Nonetheless, the ECPA’s 
overall scope of application seems narrower than that of Directive 95/46. 
While Directive 95/46 covers any processing of personal data, the ECPA 
only covers certain types of interception and access to electronic storage 
systems. 
The ECPA seems implicitly to provide some of the principles explicit 
under the European data protection laws and Directive 95/46. For 
example, the ECPA’s requirements that an interception be authorized and 
that access to an electronic storage system be within the range of such 
authorization indicate that the ECPA implicitly guarantees the principle of 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000). 
 163. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2000). 
 164. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); Gantt, supra note 9, at 353.  
 165. The ECPA defines “electronic communication” as: 
(12) any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not include—  
(A) any wire or oral communication;  
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging device;  
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in section 3117 of this title); or  
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications 
system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.  
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000). See also Jarrod J. White, E-mail@work.com: Employer Monitoring of 
Employee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1997).  
 166. Gantt, supra note 9, at 351–52; White, supra note 165, at 1081; S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 14 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568. 
 167. See, e.g., Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 
1994). In Steve Jackson Games, Inc., the Secret Service seized a computer belonging to the publishers 
that held private e-mail belonging to the publishers and 365 bulletin board system customers. The Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that this e-mail seizure violated the ECPA. Id. at 457–59, 
464. See also Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375 (D. Del. 1997); Alexander I. Rodriguez, All 
Bark, No Byte: Employee E-mail Privacy Rights in the Private-sector Workplace, 47 EMORY L.J. 
1439, 1449 (1998).  
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lawfulness.168 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit held in Watkins v. L. M. 
Berry & Co. that, under the ECPA, a personal call may be intercepted in 
the ordinary course of business only to the extent necessary to guard 
against unauthorized telephone use or to determine whether a call is 
personal. This demonstrates that the ECPA recognizes the principle of 
proportionality.169 Finally, other federal and state laws may cover 
principles not implicitly recognized under the ECPA.170 
The ECPA also provides both civil and criminal sanctions for 
violations. For example, the victim of an illegal interception may demand 
the greater of either $100 per day for each day on which a violation 
occurred, or $10,000 (plus punitive damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, 
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred).171 The victim of illegal 
access to an electronic storage system may demand at least $1,000 in 
damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other litigation costs reasonably 
incurred.172 Also, under the ECPA, a person who illegally intercepts an 
electronic communication may be imprisoned for a period of not more 
than five years.173 A person who illegally accesses an electronic storage 
system may be imprisoned for up to two years.174 Finally, fines for 
violations of the ECPA vary from $500 to $250,000.175 Unlike Directive 
95/46, however, the ECPA does not provide a right of access or a right to 
rectification.176 
2. Three Exceptions under the ECPA 
The ECPA provides some privacy protection. However, there are three 
exceptions to the ECPA’s protection of the privacy of employee 
communication: prior consent, business use, and system provider.177 These 
exceptions undermine the ECPA’s protection of employee privacy. 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000). 
 169. Watkins v. L. M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 582–83 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 170. For example, federal legislation and some state statutes prohibit monitoring employees to 
monitor union activities. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/10 (West 1986); CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 1992); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 704 (McKinney 1983). This is related to the 
finality of the collection of data and the processing of sensitive data. See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL 
R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES DATA PROTECTION 363 (1996). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(b), (c)(2) (2000). 
 172. 18 U.S.C. § 2707(b), (c) (2000). 
 173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2512(1) (2000). 
 174. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(b) (2000). 
 175. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4), 2701(b) (2000). 
 176. Cf. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, arts. 12, 14. 
 177. White, supra note 165, at 1083. 
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a. The Prior Consent Exception 
Interception by an employer of an employee’s e-mail or other on-line 
communications, including stored electronic communications, is legal 
when the employee has expressly consented.178 The ECPA permits the 
interception of an electronic communication when “one of the parties to 
the communication has given prior consent.”179 Similarly, an employer 
may access a stored electronic communication when “a user of that service 
with respect to a communication of or intended for that user” has given 
their authorization.180 
The prior consent exception encompasses implied consent. In Watkins 
v. L.M. Berry & Co., an employee sued her employer, claiming that her 
employer illegally intercepted a personal call.181 The employer had an 
established policy (of which all employees were informed) of monitoring 
business calls.182 Employees were permitted to make personal calls on 
company telephones,183 and such calls, according to the policy, would only 
be monitored to the extent necessary to determine whether a particular call 
was of a personal or business nature.184 While finding that consent must be 
specific and limited and generally should not be implied from the 
circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit nevertheless noted that limited implied 
consent was possible. It stated that courts could imply consent when an 
employee knew or should have known of an employee-monitoring policy, 
or when the employee placed personal calls on lines reserved for business 
communications that the employee knew were regularly monitored.185  
In summary, while the consent exception places a limit on monitoring 
by employers,186 employers may monitor employee communication as 
 178. Id. at 1083–84. 
 179. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2000). 
 180. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2) (2000). 
 181. Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 579 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 581–82; Jeremy U. Blackowicz, E-mail Disclosure to Third Parties in the Private-
sector Workplace, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 80, 93 (2001) (explaining that the Watkins and Deal 
decisions, “while limiting the consent to specific circumstances, suggest that an employer with a 
monitoring policy in place may escape liability for intercepting e-mail messages”); Rodriguez, supra 
note 167, at 1460. 
 186. Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992). In Deal, the Spears owned a store that was 
robbed. Suspecting their employee Deal participated in the robbery, the Spears used a tape recorder to 
monitor business and personal phone calls made on the store phone. Without giving notice of the 
monitoring to Deal, the Spears recorded twenty-two hours of phone calls. Deal sued the Spears, and 
the district court found they had notated the ECPA. However, the Eighth Circuit refused to expand the 
consent exception through merely announcing the possibility of monitoring, finding this to be 
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long as they disclose a monitoring policy to their employees in advance 
and monitor the communications according to that policy.187 This contrasts 
greatly with article 7(a) of Directive 95/46, which gives an employer in the 
private sector only limited justification for monitoring employee e-mail.188 
b. The Business Use Exception 
Employers can also monitor employee communication if the 
interception involves telephone equipment or facilities used within the 
ordinary course of business.189 Although courts have never applied this 
exception directly to e-mail, courts have developed two approaches to 
interpreting this exception within the context of telephone monitoring.190 
These two approaches are the “context approach” and the “content 
approach.” 
Under the context approach, the court considers the circumstances in 
which an employer monitors an employee’s communication. In Deal v. 
Spears, the Eighth Circuit articulated this approach as a two-pronged 
test.191 The court required that the intercepting equipment: (1) be provided 
to the subscriber by the phone company or connected by the provider to 
the phone line; and (2) be used in the ordinary course of business.192 
Applying this test to e-mail monitoring in the workplace, the first prong is 
satisfied if an employer’s computer connects to the Internet through a 
modem or network that uses a phone line.193  
insufficient for a finding of employee consent to monitoring. Id. at 1157. See also Rodriguez, supra 
note 167, at 1460. 
 187. “Cases implicating the consent exception indicate that although an employer is at risk for 
liability if it engages in unrestrained monitoring, courts will usually rule in favor of an employer who 
has announced a monitoring policy to its employees and adhered to its limits. With respect to e-mail 
communications, the rulings in Walonis (Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979)), Watkins, 
and Deal bespeak the idea that such electronic communications could be accessed under the authority 
of a published monitoring policy. Consequently, a private employer who issues a policy to its 
employees is presumably only limited by the terms of the policy itself.” Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 
1460; Gantt, supra note 9, at 358 (pointing out that (1) with a comprehensive monitoring policy, “an 
employee’s continued use of the e-mail network will presumably constitute, at a minimum, consent to 
employer interception of work-related messages and personal messages to the extent needed to 
determine whether the messages are personal or business in character,” and (2) “[e]mployers can 
expand the permissible scope simply by offering legitimate interests justifying broad monitoring 
policies”).  
 188. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 189. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2000). 
 190. Blackowicz, supra note 185, at 91; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1453. 
 191. Deal, 980 F.2d at 1157. 
 192. Id.; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1455. 
 193. Blackowicz, supra note 185, at 91. The same logic likely applies if an employer’s computer 
connects by ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line) or optic fiber. In these instances, a 
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To determine whether monitoring is within the ordinary course of 
business, thereby satisfying the second prong of the context approach, the 
court examines the circumstances surrounding the monitoring.194 Central 
to this analysis is the court’s consideration of: whether employees had 
notice that the employer might intercept communications; whether the 
employer has a legitimate business reason justifying the monitoring 
policy; and whether the time and scope of the monitoring were 
proportionate to the business reason.195 Because legitimate interests in 
monitoring abound for employers—including security, the promotion of 
workplace efficiency, and the prevention of trade secret dissemination—
advance notice will often justify e-mail monitoring by a private sector 
employer as long as the monitoring is proportionate.  
However, when the extent of the monitoring exceeds the business 
interests, courts applying the context approach generally find the 
monitoring is not exempt from the ECPA. For example, while the Eighth 
Circuit recognized in Deal that the employer’s interest in determining 
whether their employee participated in a robbery of the store was 
legitimate, it concluded that the recording of twenty-two hours of calls, 
regardless of their relation to his business interests, was excessive.196 
Because the extent of the monitoring was not justified by the legitimate 
business interest, the business use exception did not apply.197 
Thus, these principles lead to the conclusion that: (1) monitoring 
professional e-mail of an employee by an employer does not pose a legal 
problem in the private-sector; and (2) monitoring personal e-mail to 
determine whether the employee is abusing the employer’s equipment is 
allowed if the employer adopts a policy that limits or prohibits personal e-
mail in the workplace. 
Alternatively, under the content approach, courts focus on the subject 
matter of the communication.198 Courts have ruled that employers may 
lawfully intercept all business communications, but that they have only a 
limited right to monitor personal communications.199 For example, in 
Watkins, the court held an employer must show they intercepted an 
telecommunication company provides ADSL or optic fiber to an employer and connects the 
monitoring equipment, which is installed in office computers belonging to the employer, to the ADSL 
or optic fiber. As a result, ADSL and optic fiber will also meet the first prong of the “context 
approach.” 
 194. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1453. 
 195. Deal, 980 F.2d at 1158; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1454–45. 
 196. Deal, 980 F.2d at 1158. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1456. 
 199. Gantt, supra note 9, at 367; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1456. 
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employee’s communication in pursuit of a legal interest.200 The court 
concluded that the monitoring of personal calls is permissible to the extent 
necessary to guard against unauthorized telephone use or to determine 
whether a call is personal.201 Thus, the content approach does not 
completely eliminate the monitoring of an employee’s personal e-mail in 
the private-sector workplace.202 
c. The Provider Exception 
The third exception to the ECPA is the provider exception, which lets 
system providers monitor employee e-mail.203 This exception may 
potentially allow many employers to monitor employee communication. 
The central issue in these cases is whether an employer qualifies as a 
system provider. In Flanagan v. Epson America, a California court noted 
in a footnote that the provider exception would have exempted a private 
network provider from liability.204 Given that an employer is often a 
private network provider (as the owner of a company’s e-mail system), 
this exception will allow an employer to monitor freely employee e-
mail.205 
 200. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 579; Blackowicz, supra note 185, at 92. 
 201. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 583. 
 202. Cf. Blackowicz, supra note 185, at 93. 
 203. Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., No. BC 007036 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 12, 1991), cited in 
Gantt, supra note 9, at 359. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 creates an exception for business-use interceptions: 
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, 
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic communication service, whose 
facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, 
disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his employment while engaged in 
any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of 
the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of wire 
communication service to the public shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring 
except for mechanical or service quality control checks. 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). § 2701(c)(1) creates an exception for stored communications 
when conduct is authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic 
communications service.” 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2000). 
A person or entity may divulge the contents of a communication to a person employed or authorized, 
or to a person whose facilities are used to forward such communication to its destination. Disclosure is 
also permitted when it is necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection of the 
rights or property of the provider of that service. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(4)–(5) (2000). 
 204. Gantt, supra note 9, at 359–60. 
 205. Blackowicz, supra note 185, at 90–91. See also Kevin P. Kopp, Electronic Communications 
in the Workplace: E-mail Monitoring and the Right of Privacy, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 861, 872–
73 (1998) (suggesting that the provider exception will broadly exempt employer-providers). In Bohach 
v. City of Reno, one of the cases explained in Kopp’s article, the internal affairs division of the Reno 
Police Department began an investigation of the messages several officers were sending over the 
computerized pager system. The officers sued the City of Reno for violating the ECPA and the 
Constitution. Finding that the ECPA’s provider exception applied to the city, the district court 
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Overall, the three ECPA exceptions—the prior consent, the business 
use, and the provider exceptions—enable an employer in the private-sector 
to monitor employee e-mail by providing advance notice of the 
monitoring.206 And, as such, these exceptions swallow the general 
protections provided by the ECPA. 
C. State Law 
While most state constitutions do not protect the privacy of a private 
person from infringement by another private person, most states do have 
statutes that regulate or restrict the interception of wire communications. 
Additionally, state common law has developed monitoring limits. Even 
given these restrictions on monitoring, it is difficult for an employee to 
establish their case under state statutes and common law. 
1. State Constitutions and Statutory Law 
Like the U.S. Constitution, the constitutions of most states neither 
explicitly nor implicitly protect a person’s right to privacy from invasion 
by a private actor. The constitution of California provides some 
protection,207 but to justify an invasion, an employer still would only need 
to show that the invasion substantially furthered a “competing” and 
“legitimate” countervailing interest.208 Given an employer’s 
aforementioned interests in security, efficiency, and the prevention of 
trade secret dissemination, employers will likely prevail under the 
California constitution. 
Additionally, though most states have statutes to limit or regulate e-
mail monitoring, they are usually insufficient to protect employee privacy. 
analogized this pager system to e-mail. See Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1233–34, 
1236 (D. Nev. 1996). 
 206. An employer probably ends up monitoring an employee’s personal e-mail at least 
incidentally under the ECPA exceptions. 
 207. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1446–47. In California, the state constitutional protection 
applies to both public and private employers. Thus, no state action is necessary to make a 
constitutional claim against a private-sector employer. See DECKER, infra note 272, at 131. 
 208. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). Until Hill, California 
case law required employers show a compelling interest in order to justify their invasion of employee 
privacy. The court in Hill, however, distinguished invasions of interests “fundamental to personal 
autonomy” from invasions of “less central” privacy interests. To justify an invasion of an interest 
“fundamental to personal autonomy,” an employer must demonstrate a compelling interest. 
Conversely, an employer need only present a countervailing interest to justify infringing a “less 
central” interest under Hill. The court then established a balancing test, which requires the privacy 
interests at issue “be specifically identified and carefully compared with competing or countervailing 
privacy and non-privacy interests.” Gantt, supra note 9, at 391–92. 
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Theoretically, states may enact laws that protect the right to privacy to a 
greater extent than the ECPA because the ECPA typically only preempts 
state laws that are less protective than the federal law.209 However, some 
state statutes fail to include electronic messages within the category of 
protected communications.210 Moreover, because most are modeled on the 
ECPA,211 state statutes have exceptions similar to those of the ECPA. 
Even though these exceptions may be narrower than those under the 
ECPA,212 state statutes modeled on the ECPA nevertheless have similar 
weaknesses. 
Connecticut and Delaware enacted statutes modeled on the Notice of 
Electronic Monitoring Act.213 Under the Connecticut statute, an employer 
who engages in electronic monitoring must give prior written notice to 
employees214 listing the possible types of monitoring.215 The employer 
must post the notice in a conspicuous place that is readily accessible to 
employees.216 Under the Delaware statute, an employer cannot monitor or 
otherwise intercept any telephone, e-mail, or internet transmission by an 
employee unless the employee has first been notified.217 Such notice must 
be in writing and signed by the employee.218 
These statutes have their limits. First, when an employer prohibits 
personal e-mail and gives employees advance notice of e-mail monitoring, 
these statutes may justify such monitoring on the basis of the employer’s 
interest in checking for violations of the personal e-mail prohibition. 
Second, the Connecticut statute, for instance, allows an employer, under 
certain conditions, to engage in electronic monitoring without giving 
employees prior notice.219 
 209. Id. at 395. 
 210. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1461. 
 211. Id. at 1461 n.149. 
 212. Gantt, supra note 9, at 395; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1461. In general, courts interpret 
exceptions to state law more narrowly than exceptions to the ECPA. For example, unlike the ECPA, 
some states require the consent of all parties for monitoring to be legal. See generally Gantt, supra 
note 9, at 395–403. 
 213. Virginia General Assembly Joint Commission on Technology & Science, Privacy Advisory 
Committee, Privacy Advisory Committee Summaries: Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act, at 
http://jcots.state.va.us/Studies/Privacy/2001/2001_Summaries.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). 
 214. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2001). 
 215. Id. 
 216. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-48d(b)(1) (2003). 
 217. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705(b) (2001). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Section 31-48d(b) of the Connecticut statute states: 
(2) When (A) an employer has reasonable grounds to believe that employees are engaged in 
conduct which (i) violates the law, (ii) violates the legal rights of the employer or the 
employer’s employees, or (iii) creates a hostile workplace environment, and (B) electronic 
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2. State Common Law 
State common law provides four invasion of privacy causes of action: 
(1) unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another; (2) 
misappropriation of another’s name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity 
given to another’s private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably places 
another in a false light before the public.220 Of these, the cause of action 
for unreasonable intrusion on the seclusion of another usually applies to 
employee communication privacy cases.221 
The Fourth Amendment balancing test influences courts assessing 
causes of action dealing with an unreasonable intrusion on the privacy of 
another.222 This balancing test compares an individual’s expectation of 
privacy with the interests of the government in engaging in the conduct at 
issue.223 Courts employ a similar balancing test when they examine an 
invasion of privacy cause of action. Such an action typically has four 
elements.224 First, the intrusion must have been intentional.225 Second, the 
act must be highly offensive to the reasonable person.226 Third, the 
plaintiff’s activity must have been subjectively and objectively private.227 
Fourth, the intruder cannot have had a legitimate purpose justifying the 
monitoring may produce evidence of this misconduct, the employer may conduct monitoring 
without giving prior written notice. 
CONN. GEN. STAT § 31-48d (b)(2) (2001). 
 220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-E (1976); Cantrell v. American 
Broadcasting Cos., 529 F. Supp. 746, 756 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating that Illinois recognizes all four 
causes of action for invasion of privacy); Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 439 (E.D. Va. 1980) 
(stating that a number of jurisdictions recognize all four invasion of privacy causes of action); 
Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharmaceuticals, 86 Cal. App. 4th 365, 372 (2001) (stating that California 
recognizes all four invasion of privacy causes of action). 
 221. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1462. 
 222. Gantt, supra note 9, at 380; Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1443. 
 223. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz has 
influenced the analysts of other courts in Fourth Amendment cases. Justice Harlan suggested that an 
individual has a constitutionally-recognized expectation of privacy when they satisfy a two-prong test. 
First, the individual must have exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Second, society 
must be prepared to recognize that expectation as “reasonable.” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). See 
also Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1443 n.25 (citing Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974)); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (taking 
a balancing approach). 
 224. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1463. 
 225. See, e.g., Benn v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14314, at *22–23 (S.D. 
Fla. 1999); Patton v. United Parcel Serv., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1276 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Winegard v. 
Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Iowa 1977). 
 226. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 622 (3d Cir. 1992); Keating v. 
Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18690, at *44 (E.D. Pa. 2000); 
Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., 865 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
 227. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1463 n.168. 
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invasion.228 This balancing test, which examines the reasonableness of the 
privacy expectation, parallels the approach used in Halford v. United 
Kingdom.229 
When these elements are applied to actual facts, however, it is difficult 
for an employee to establish their case.230 For example, a court may find 
that the act in question is not highly offensive to the reasonable person 
because of the gradual nature of the monitoring231 or because the employer 
gave notice of the monitoring.232 Courts may also be reluctant to find that 
an employee’s work environment is sufficiently private for an invasion to 
occur.233 Thus, courts tend to conclude that an employers’ interest prevails 
over employees’ privacy interest.234  
For example, in Smyth v. Pillsbury Corp., an employee sued his 
employer for a common law invasion of privacy.235 The employee alleged 
that the employer intercepted the employee’s e-mail, even though the 
employer had repeatedly assured employees that e-mail communications 
were confidential and privileged.236 The court concluded that the 
employer’s interest in preventing inappropriate and unprofessional 
comments or illegal activity from occurring over its e-mail system 
outweighed any privacy interest the employee may have had in her e-
mail.237 This case illustrates that, in sum, employers are likely to prevail 
under state common law.238 
Overall, in the United States, a private-sector employer is likely able to 
monitor both the professional and personal e-mail of their employees so 
long as they provide employees with advance notice of the monitoring. 
Because U.S. statutes and common law do not distinguish business from 
non-business hours, this distinction is largely ignored in the United 
 228. Courts often describe this element as whether the information publicized is not of legitimate 
concern to the public. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 731 (5th Cir. 1995); Faison v. Parker, 
823 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 229. See supra Part II.C. 
 230. Wilborn, supra note 9, at 844. 
 231. Id. This standard frequently forecloses an employee’s claim based on typical workplace 
monitoring and surveillance. Routine monitoring can appear harmless from some perspectives, 
especially that of a third party, and the negative effects of such monitoring are often gradual and 
incremental. Id. 
 232. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1463–64. For example, if an employer notified employees that 
e-mail monitoring could occur, a court may conclude that the employer’s acts were not highly 
offensive and that an objective expectation of privacy was unreasonable at the time. Id. 
 233. Wilborn, supra note 9, at 846. 
 234. White, supra note 165, at 1097. 
 235. Smyth v. Pillsbury Corp., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 236. Id. at 98. 
 237. Id. at 101; White, supra note 165, at 1098. 
 238. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1464; Wilborn, supra note 9, at 846. 
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States.239 If this distinction is ignored, the legal treatment of private-sector 
e-mail monitoring in the workplace in the United States will likely be very 
similar to that in Western Europe. 
IV. DATA PROTECTION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYEES IN WESTERN 
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
The preceding parts of this Article have shown that Western Europe 
and the United States provide similar levels of data protection for private-
sector employees. In both regions, a private-sector employer may monitor 
employee e-mail with advance notice of monitoring; however, the level of 
monitoring allowed will not necessarily remain similar in Western Europe 
and the United States. The right to privacy enjoys a higher status in 
Western Europe than it does in the United States, and the government 
plays a greater role in its protection in Western Europe. In light of a recent 
French case and a series of corporate scandals in the United States, it is 
likely that Western Europe will increase data protection accorded private-
sector employees to a greater extent than the United States. 
A. Factors to Consider in Predicting the Future: The Status of the Right to 
Privacy and the Role of Government 
To increase the level of private-sector employee data protection, new 
statutes or an evolution in the treatment of the principle in case law will be 
necessary. This, however, depends on the status of the right to privacy and 
the role of government. The more protected the right to privacy, the more 
likely statutes or case law will change. Similarly, the larger the role of the 
government, the more likely there will be governmental action that will 
increase the level of data protection for employees. The right to privacy 
enjoys a higher status and the government plays a greater role in 
protecting citizens in Western Europe than in the United States. Thus, data 
protection is likely to be advanced to a greater extent in Western Europe. 
1. The Status of the Right to Privacy 
a. In Western Europe 
In Western Europe, important texts at both the supranational and 
national levels establish the right to privacy as a fundamental right. For 
 239. Id. 
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example, the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
specifically provides in article 8 for the right to privacy.240 All twenty-five 
member states of the European Union are parties to the ECHR,241 and, 
therefore, recognize the right to privacy. Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union242 also designates the right to 
privacy as fundamental.243 In addition to these supranational texts, laws at 
the national level also guarantee the right to privacy. For example, 
Germany’s Basic Law protects the right to privacy by guaranteeing human 
dignity244 and the freedom of personality.245 Similarly, the Spanish 
Constitution has a specific provision on the right to privacy.246 
Moreover, Western Europe specifically guarantees data protection as a 
fundamental right. Article I of the Council of Europe Convention 
explicitly includes data protection within the fundamental right to 
 240. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
art. 8, 313 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/005.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004) [hereinafter ECHR]. Article 8 of the ECHR provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.  
Id. 
 241. The twenty-five Member States of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maltar, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. See European Union, European Union Member States, at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/government/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2004). Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom ratified the ECHR in the 1950s. The other Member States had all ratified by 1998. See 
Council of Europe, Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=8&DF=1/24/ 
05&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). 
 242. Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364/01), 
[hereinafter Charter]. The president of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 
signed the Charter at the European Council meeting in Nice on December 7 to 9, 2000. For the first 
time in the European Union’s history, the Charter enumerates in a single text the entire range of civil, 
political, economic, and social rights of European Union citizens and residents. The Charter confirms 
human rights recognized by various legal instruments, including the ECHR and the constitutions of 
member states of the European Union. See European Parliament, The Charter of Fundamental Human 
Rights of the European Union, available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/charter/default_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 243. Charter, supra note 242, art. 7; ECHR, supra note 240, art. 8. 
 244. Art. 1, para. 1 GG.  
 245. Art. 2, para. 1 GG. See also Monahan, supra note 54, at 283. 
 246. CONSTITUĆION ESPAÑOLA [SPANISH CONSTITUTION] [C.E.] art. 18, para. 1. See also 
Monahan, supra note 54, at 283. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p209 Suda article book pages.doc 4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
privacy.247 Directive 95/46 also considers data protection to be a 
fundamental privacy right.248 Furthermore, the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights provides for data protection.249 At the national level, 
the Spanish constitution includes a specific provision placing 
electronically stored data within its iteration of the right to privacy.250 
In addition, Western Europe recognizes these fundamental privacy 
rights in the workplace. The European Court of Human Rights took this 
position in Niemietz v. Germany.251 In Niemietz, an anti-clerical activist 
wrote a letter threatening a judge who was presiding over the criminal 
proceeding of a person who had failed to pay their Church tax.252 The 
letter came from a branch of a political party called Freiburg Bunte 
Liste.253 Because Niemietz, another anti-clerical activist, had previously 
chaired Freiburg Bunte Liste, letters addressed to the political party were 
forwarded to his office254 and the Munich District Court issued a search 
warrant for Niemietz’s office.255 Niemietz argued that the search violated 
his right to privacy under article 8 of the ECHR,256 while Germany 
contended that article 8 does not protect professional life.257  
Rejecting the distinction between private and professional contexts, the 
European Court of Human Rights declared that: 
Respect for private life must also comprise to a certain degree the 
right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings. 
 There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why this 
understanding of the notion of “private life” should be taken to 
 247. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 30, art. 1. 
 248. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 1, para. 1. 
 249. Charter, supra note 242, art. 8. Article 8 provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data on themselves. 
2. Such data must be fairly processed for specified purposes with either the consent of the 
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right to 
access and rectify data collected concerning themselves. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
Id. 
 250. CONSTITUĆION ESPAÑOLA, supra note 246, art. 18, para. 4. 
 251. Niemietz v. Germany, 251-B Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (1992), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=niemetz%20%7C%20v.%20%7C%2
0germany&sessionid=563786&skin=hudoc-en (last visited Dec. 20, 2004). 
 252. Id. at 27. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 32. 
 256. Id. at 33. 
 257. Id. 
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exclude activities of a professional or business nature since it is, 
after all, in the course of their working lives that the majority of 
people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of 
developing relationships with the outside world. This view is 
supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed out by the 
Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly which 
of an individual’s activities form part of his professional or business 
life and which do not.258 
Thus, in Niemietz, the European Court of Human Rights held that the 
fundamental right to privacy extends to the workplace. The European 
Court of Human Rights later affirmed this position in Amann v. 
Switzerland.259 
At the national level, Belgium protects an employee’s right to privacy 
in the workplace by emphasizing human dignity. The Belgian Privacy 
Commission, an independent organ of the Belgian government responsible 
for the regulation of personal data processing and the protection of 
privacy,260 declared that making employees work under constant 
surveillance contravenes human dignity and is not necessarily 
productive.261 Accordingly, the Commission concluded that an employer 
cannot monitor all aspects of employee activities.262 
The law in Finland is in agreement with the stance of the Belgian 
Commission. In October 2001, Finland’s Act on the Protection of Privacy 
in Working Life entered into force.263 The purpose of the act is “to 
implement the protection of private life and other basic rights safeguarding 
privacy, and to promote the development of and compliance with good 
processing practice, when personal data are processed in working life.”264 
 258. Id. 
 259. Amann v. Switzerland (27798/95), [2000] Eur. Ct. H.R. 87 (2000), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=amann%2
0%7C%20v.%20%7C%20switzerland&sessionid=563797&skin=hudoc-en (last visited Jan. 18, 2005). 
 260. Commission de la Protection de la Vie Privée [Belgian Privacy Commission], Plan de 
Gestion [Strategic Development Plan] ver. 12, Oct. 15, 2003, available at http://www.privacy.fgov.be/ 
la_commission/plan_de_gestion.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 261. Commission de la Protection de la Vie Privée [Belgian Privacy Commission], Avis de 
initiative relatif à la Surveillance par l’Employeur de l’Utilisation du Système Informatique sur le Lieu 
de Travail [Opinion on Employer Monitoring of Computer System Usage in the Workplace] (Apr. 3, 
2000), available at http://193.191.208.6/juris/jurfv.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). See also JEAN-
EMMANUEL RAY, LE DROIT DU TRAVAIL À L’EPREUVE DES NTIC [LABOR LAW FACING THE TEST OF 
NEW TECHNOLOGY OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION] 102–04 (2d ed. 2001). 
 262. Id. 
 263. The Act on Protection of Privacy in Working Life (477/2001), Oct. 1, 2001 (Finland), 
available at http://www.mol.fi/english/working/dataprotection.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 264. Id. art. 1. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p209 Suda article book pages.doc 4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
248 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applicable to both the private and public sector,265 article 9 states that 
“employer actions shall not jeopardize the secrecy of the employee’s 
private, confidential messages when using electronic mail or data 
networks.”266 
Overall, Europe considers the right to privacy, including data 
protection, to be fundamental, even in the workplace. It seems likely that 
England will give the right to privacy similar treatment. Admittedly, 
England shares with the United States the common law tradition, which 
does not necessarily regard the right to privacy as fundamental. Indeed, the 
Lawful Business Practice Regulation of 2000, a British regulation of 
telecommunication monitoring in business, broadly allows an employer in 
the private-sector to monitor employee e-mail.267 However, the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights is binding authority in the United 
Kingdom because it is a party to the treaty establishing the court. The 
United Kingdom is also a member of the European Union, which, as 
mentioned, considers the right to privacy as fundamental. As a result, the 
United Kingdom will be constrained to respect the right to privacy. 
Indeed, some judgments in the United Kingdom already cite article 8 of 
the ECHR as an important source for the right to privacy.268 
b. The United States 
A citizen has the right to privacy under the constitutional scheme of the 
United States.269 As early as the late nineteenth century, the Supreme 
Court of the United States recognized that the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments protect an individual’s home and privacy.270 In Mapp v. 
Ohio, the Court recognized that the right to privacy is an important right 
reserved to the people.271 Then, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court 
 265. Id. art. 2. 
 266. Id. art. 9, para. 4. 
 267. The Telecommunications (Lawful Business Practice) (Interception of Communications) 
Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/2699, available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002699.htm (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2004). Because this regulation allows an employer to monitor any telecommunication 
to determine whether it relates to business (Id. art. 3(2)(a)), it is similar to the ECPA business 
exception. 
 268. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 15, available at 2004 WL 852411; 
Douglas v. Hello! Ltd., [2004] E.M.L.R. 14, para. 16, available at 2004 WL 62050. 
 269. Rodriguez, supra note 167, at 1442–43; Martha Rundell, Decisions Between Consenting 
Adults Made in Private—No Place for the Government to Tread, 60 LA. L. REV. 877, 878 (2000). 
 270. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The court explained that the doctrines 
underlying the Fourth and Fifth Amendments “apply to all invasions on the part of the government and 
its employes of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.” Id. at 630. 
 271. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp, the Court applied the exclusionary rule, which 
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concluded that emanations from various guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
create a zone of privacy.272 Thus, the U.S. Constitution guarantees the 
right to privacy indirectly through several amendments, rather than 
directly through a single amendment. 
However, the absence of a specific amendment protecting the right to 
privacy leaves the right vulnerable, because it allows other rights, 
especially those explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, to compete with 
privacy interests.273 For example, courts often protect First Amendment 
rights in the face of conflict with the right to privacy, as evidenced by the 
rarity with which courts enjoin the dissemination of information based on 
the invasion of privacy. Most states share this problem, as only ten state 
constitutions explicitly guarantee the right to privacy.274 
In Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, the Ninth Circuit addressed the question of 
injunctive and monetary relief against persons and organizations 
publishing photographs, addresses, and other personal information about 
requires a Court to exclude evidence obtained through an unlawful search or seizure from a criminal 
trial, to evidence collected by state police officers. The Court noted that if it adopted another rule, “the 
right to privacy, no less important than any other right carefully and particularly reserved to the people 
would stand in marked contrast to all other rights declared as ‘basic to a free society.’” Id. at 656. 
 272. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). The Court held that emanations from the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth form the basis of the right of privacy. See Charlesworth, supra 
note 13, at 91 (stating that the First, Third, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments are relevant to the right 
to privacy in addition to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY 
LAW AND PRACTICE 107 (1987) (noting that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments relate to the right to privacy). 
 273. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 100. 
 274. These ten states are Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people 
to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); CAL. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing 
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“Every natural person has the 
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person’s private life except as 
otherwise provided herein.”); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The 
legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right.”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people 
shall have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against 
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by 
eavesdropping devices or other means.”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure in his 
person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, 
or invasions of privacy.”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The right of individual privacy is essential to 
the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest.”); S.C. CONST. art. I, 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy 
shall not be violated . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private 
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).  
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doctors and other abortion service providers on an anti-abortion website 
called the “Nuremberg Files.”275 While the court declined to decide 
whether the First Amendment would protect defendants in an invasion of 
privacy suit,276 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision, which 
enjoined the dissemination of addresses and other personal information on 
doctors and others.277 Even though it admitted that the website frightened 
doctors and included offensive statements, the court nevertheless allowed 
the dissemination of such personal information.278 
In City of Kirkland v. Sheehan, an unreported case from Washington 
State, the King County Superior Court dealt with a similar issue.279 
Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the operation of a website that was critical of 
law enforcement officers and listed the names, addresses, birth dates, 
telephone numbers, and social security numbers of the officers, as well as 
other personal information.280 The court concluded that this dissemination 
of legally obtained private addresses, telephone numbers, and other 
personal information is speech protected by the First Amendment. The 
court enjoined the dissemination of the social security numbers, however, 
because access to an individual’s social security number enables a third 
party to control, manipulate, or alter other personal information.281 
The status of the right to privacy in the workplace is less elevated in the 
United States than in Western Europe. Of the amendments supporting a 
zone of privacy, the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures, forms the core. The Fourth Amendment’s protection 
of privacy began with the prohibition of unreasonable searches and 
seizures in the home.282 Additionally, in an influential article on the right 
to privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis argued that the right to 
privacy forbids invasion by a private person in domestic life.283 These 
principles lead to the conclusion that an employer must respect employee 
privacy outside the office and at home. On the other hand, the right to 
privacy has developed with a distinction between professional and 
personal space.284 While the right protects personal space, courts generally 
 275. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 
244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 276. Id. at 1016 n.10. 
 277. Id. at 1020. 
 278. Id. at 1017. 
 279. City of Kirkland v. Sheehan, 29 Media L. Rep. 2367 (Wash. Super. May 10, 2001). 
 280. Id. at 2368. 
 281. Id. at 2372. 
 282. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629–30 (1885). 
 283. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV 193 (1890). 
 284. See supra Part III. 
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do not apply it to professional spaces.285 This distinction does not exist in 
Western Europe, where the right to privacy is considered fundamental 
even in the workplace.286 
2. Role of the Government 
In Western Europe, the government is expected to and does actively 
protect its citizens. Many Western European governments “provide, pay 
for and heavily regulate essential services.”287 For example, Western 
European governments generally maintain extensive social security 
systems intended to reduce social inequality.288 “In fact, even in England, 
which has a common law tradition, the government often provides, or at 
least subsidizes many essential services, including education, housing and 
health care.”289 Viewing the government as a guarantor of their rights, 
European citizens accept and often appreciate the government’s intensive 
involvement in their daily lives.290 
Conversely, in the United States, the government does not play an 
active role in guaranteeing citizens’ rights. American society is 
traditionally skeptical of government,291 making it hard for the government 
to become involved in daily life to protect citizens’ rights. Because of this 
skepticism, the government tends to play a role in protecting citizens’ 
 285. Id. 
 286. See supra Part II. 
 287. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 44. 
 288. Carol Graham, Public Attitudes Matter: A Conceptual Framework for Accounting for 
Political Economy in Safety Nets and Social Assistance Policies, Dec. 2002, 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/HDNet/hddocs.nsf/0/8a423b475eb64f9c85256c9b005f9798/$FILE/02
33.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 289. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 19, at 44. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Fred H. Cate, Privacy and Telecommunications, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 33 (1998). Jane 
E. Kirtley explains: 
Privacy advocates urge the adoption of the European model for data protection in the name of 
protecting individual civil liberties. But in so doing, they ignore, or repudiate, an important 
aspect of the American democratic tradition: distrust of powerful central government. The 
Bill of Rights is supposed to protect the American people from the government. Statutes such 
as the federal Privacy Act and the Paperwork Reduction Act demonstrate that when it comes 
to privacy, Americans generally do not assume that the government necessarily has citizens’ 
best interests at heart. This is especially so when the government piously invokes “protection 
of privacy” as the justification for withholding information, or perhaps even more 
significantly, for engaging in intrusive activities. The European paradigm assumes a much 
higher comfort level with a far more authoritarian government. Skeptical Americans want 
checks in the system to keep the government “honest.” 
Jane E. Kirtley, The EU Data Protection Directive and the First Amendment: Why a “Press 
Exemption” Won’t Work, 80 IOWA L. REV. 639, 648–49 (1995). 
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rights only when there is a huge outcry from the public. Even then, the 
government’s role tends to be modest, and its approach minimalist. 
For example, Congress adopted the 1988 Video Privacy Protection Act 
after a journalist outraged the public by publishing a list of 146 
videocassettes rented by a U.S. Supreme Court Justice candidate and his 
wife.292 The Video Privacy Protection Act imposes civil liability on video 
service providers who disclose a customer’s video rental record without 
the customer’s authorization.293 However, under this act, providers may 
release mailing lists, including a list of their customers’ preferences by 
category, for direct marketing purposes.294  
Similarly, Congress adopted the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act295 
following a strong public reaction to an actress’s murder by a fan. The fan 
obtained the actress’s address from a detective who had learned it from the 
California Department of Motor Vehicles.296 The Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act forbids a state’s department of motor vehicles from 
releasing personal information from a driver’s records,297 though the act 
also allows fourteen exemptions to this prohibition.298 
Overall, the United States regulates privacy on a category by category 
basis, while establishing exemptions to a regulation’s restrictions. While 
the U.S. government is less active than governments in Western Europe in 
protecting citizens’ rights, employer-employee relations play a 
supplemental role.299 For example, collective bargaining agreements may 
potentially restrict permissible monitoring purposes.300 However, because 
many employers monitor employee e-mail without advance notice to 
employees,301 the effectiveness of company policy in protecting employee 
privacy may be limited. 
B. The Future of Employee Data Protection in the Private-Sector After 
Nikon France and U.S. Corporate Scandals 
Two recent events may potentially increase the level of data protection 
of private-sector employees. First, in October 2001, the French Court of 
 292. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000). See also Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 93. 
 293. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (b)(1)(2000). 
 294. Monahan, supra note 54, at 281. 
 295. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721–2725 (2000). 
 296. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 93 
 297. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act § 2721(a); see also Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 93. 
 298. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act § 2721(a); Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 93. 
 299. Cf. SCHWARTZ & REIDENBERG, supra note 170, at 367–77. 
 300. Id. at 369–70. 
 301. Id. at 375. 
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Cassation rendered a judgment in favor of an employee whose employer 
had accessed documents on the employee’s office computer.302 Second, in 
the United States, a series of corporate scandals, involving companies such 
as Enron and WorldCom, has increased distrust of employers. Taking into 
account the aforementioned factors, Western Europe will probably 
increase the level of data protection, while the United States most likely 
will not. 
1. Nikon France 
Nikon France v. Onof is an innovative judgment from the Court of 
Cassation.303 Before Nikon France, the Court of Cassation had established 
two limits on monitoring by a private-sector employer. Even with these 
limits, however, an employer could monitor e-mail sent during business 
hours by providing advance notice to employees. Nikon France severely 
limited an employer’s ability to monitor e-mail, even during business 
hours. 
The Court of Cassation established these limits in Néocel v. Spaeter. In 
Néocel v. Spaeter, an employer fired a sales clerk after observing her 
through a hidden camera located near where she worked.304 Holding that 
the images recorded by the camera were not admissible into evidence, the 
Court of Cassation reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 
Colmar for the employer.305 
First, the Court of Cassation declared that an employer in the private-
sector must give employees advance notice of monitoring.306 Second, it 
implied that an employer in the private-sector cannot monitor an employee 
during non-business hours. The Court of Cassation held, “[i]f the 
employer has a right to control and monitor the activity of her employees 
during the business hours, all the records, whatever the motive may be, of 
images or spoken words made without the employees’ knowledge, 
constitute illegal mode of proof.”307 Because subordination to an 
employer’s control mostly covers business hours, an employer has less 
 302. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull Civ. V, No. 291. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Cass. soc., Nov. 21, 1991, Bull Civ. V, No. 519. 
 305. Id. See also MARIE-PIERRE FENOLL-TROUSSEAU & GERARD HAAS, LA 
CYBERSURVEILLANCE DANS L’ENTREPRISE ET LE DROIT [THE CYBERSURVEILLANCE IN THE COMPANY 
AND THE LAW] 29 (2002); Philippe Waquet, Un Employer Peut-Il Filmer à Leur Insu Ses Salariés? 
[Can an Employer Film Her Employees without Their Knowledge?], 1992 DR. SOC. 28, 31 (1992) 
[hereinafter Waquet I]. 
 306. Cass. soc., Nov. 21, 1991, Bull Civ. V, No. 519. 
 307. Id. (emphasis added). 
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authority to control employees during non-business hours. This limit does 
not exist in either the case law of the ECHR or the European Court of 
Justice. The American system also does not have this limit. 
While later judgments and the French Labor Code follow the 
prohibition of monitoring without notice established by Néocel,308 French 
case law before Nikon France found few problems with the monitoring of 
employees in the private-sector during business hours, as long as the 
employer gave advance notice of the monitoring. For example, in March 
2000, the Court of Cassation affirmed an employer’s right to monitor the 
activity of employees during business hours.309 The court concluded that 
an employer could listen to an employee’s personal conversation on the 
employer’s phone because the employer had given advance notice of the 
monitoring. In September 2000, le Conseil de prud’hommes in 
Montbéliard, a conciliation board for labor issues, upheld a sanction 
against an employee who sent personal e-mail during business hours.310 In 
this case, a current employee sent a former employee information 
regarding the employer’s reorganization plans despite the employer’s 
prohibition on personal e-mail in the workplace.311 In February 2000, le 
Conseil de prud’hommes in Paris similarly justified a sanction against an 
employee who sent an e-mail to a friend in Australia during business hours 
even though the employer had limited e-mail use to professional 
purposes.312 Such sanctions are legitimate only if an employer can present 
evidence that an employee sent a personal e-mail. An employer often 
obtains this evidence, however, by monitoring employees. Thus, the logic 
of the October 2001 judgment of the Court of Cassation313 applies to e-
mail monitoring. 
However, a subtle change in the notion of privacy created tension in 
France. In 1997, the Court of Cassation started to use the term, “la vie 
personelle,” to designate the notion of privacy instead of “la vie privée,” 
 308. See Cass. soc., Dec. 10, 1997, Bull. Civ. V, No. 434 (surveillance by video camera); Cass. 
soc., Feb. 4, 1998, Bull. Civ. V, No. 64; Cass. soc., May 22, 1995, Bull. Civ. V, No. 164 (surveillance 
by a private detective); Cass. soc., May 15, 2001, RJS 7/01 No. 830 (monitoring the use of a vending 
machine by employees). See also C. TRAV., art. L. 121-8 (Fr.). 
 309. Cass. soc. Mar. 14, 2000, Bull. Civ. V, No. 101. 
 310. C.P.H. Montbéliard, Sept. 19, 2000, RG No. F 00/00022. 
 311. Id.; Note, 1042 SEM. SOC. LAMY 13 (2001). 
 312. C.P.H. Paris, Feb. 1, 2000, No. 99-08.523. While the Court of Appeals in Paris also justified 
a sanction in a similar situation, C. Paris, May 22, 2000, RG No. 298/34330, le Conseil de 
prud’hommes in Nanterre did not uphold a sanction against an employee who accessed a pornographic 
website during business hours. However, in that case, it was easy to manipulate the data on the sites 
visited by the employee stored on the hard drive. C.P.H. Nanterre, July 16, 1999, RG No. F 98/013. 
 313. See supra note 301. 
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which had been used previously.314 The former notion is broader than the 
latter and assumes that privacy exists, even during business hours, both in 
and outside the workplace.315 This new notion of privacy, however, 
conflicted with established law, which allowed an employer in the private-
sector to monitor an employee’s professional and personal e-mail as long 
as there was advance notice. The judgment in Nikon France came in the 
middle of this tension. 
In Nikon France, the Court of Cassation declared that an employer 
cannot read personal messages sent or received by an employee on a 
computer belonging to their employer and used by the employee for their 
work.316 Nikon France, the employer of Frédéric Onof, opened and 
copied two folders titled “personal” and “fax,” respectively, from Onof’s 
computer while he was absent.317 Examining those folders, the employer 
found that Onof had used the computer for personal activities despite the 
employer’s prohibition on such use.318 
In condemning the actions of Nikon France, the Court of Cassation 
stated that an employee has a right to respect for their privacy, even during 
business hours and in the workplace.319 The Court of Cassation declared 
that it would be a violation of a fundamental freedom, namely the right to 
privacy and secrecy of correspondence, for an employer to read personal 
messages sent or received by their employee on a computer belonging to 
the employer and used by the employee for work.320 The Court of 
Cassation added that monitoring personal messages violates this 
fundamental freedom even if the employer prohibits the usage of the 
computer for non-professional purposes.321 As a result, the state of the law 
in France is now that, absent exceptional circumstances, an employer in 
the private-sector cannot monitor personal e-mail sent by an employee 
during business hours, even if the employer has given advance notice of 
the monitoring or has prohibited the use of e-mail for personal purposes.322 
In Nikon France, the Court of Cassation furthered the notion of “la vie 
personnelle” by recognizing that an employee has a right to privacy in the 
 314. Philippe Waquet, Retour sur l’arrêt Nikon [Return to the Nikon Judgment], 1065 SEM. SOC. 
LAMY 5, 6 (2002) [hereinafter Waquet II]. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull Civ. V, No. 291. 
 317. Stanislas Kehrig, Disque Dur de l’Employeur et Vie Personnelle du Salarié [Hard Disk of the 
Employer and Privacy of the Employee], 1045 SEM. SOC. LAMY 6, 6 (2001). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull Civ. V, No. 291. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Kehrig, supra note 317, at 9. 
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workplace during business hours. The Court of Cassation relied on article 
8 of the ECHR,323 article 9 of the French Civil Code,324 article 9 of the 
New French Code of Civil Procedure,325 and article L. 120-2 of the French 
Labor Code.326 However, it did not cite Directive 95/46 in coming to its 
decision. 
Article 9 of the New French Code of Civil Procedure addresses fairness 
of proof in two senses. The notion of fairness is respected through its 
prohibition on monitoring without advance notice, which has been an 
integral part of French case law since Néocel. Additionally, the case law 
since Nikon France seems to show that fairness of proof requires the 
presence of the employee when monitored by the employer. In December 
2001, the Court of Cassation concluded that it was illegal for an employer 
to fire an employee after opening the employee’s personal closet during 
his absence and finding cans of beer.327 According to the court, a 
company’s internal regulations must set forth the conditions under which 
monitoring would be undertaken,328 and the presence of the employee at 
the time of monitoring is mandatory.329 Nikon France mentioned article 9 
of the New French Code of Civil Procedure. This, taken in conjunction 
with the facts of the case (the employee was absent during the monitoring 
by Nikon France and whether there was advance notice of monitoring was 
unclear) and the fact that case law began to explicitly require the presence 
of the employee only after Nikon France, makes it likely that the 
employee’s absence was a factor in finding a violation of article 9 of the 
New French Code of Civil Procedure. 
The court’s citation of article L. 120-2 of the French Labor Code shows 
that the principle set forth in Nikon France is itself not innovative. 
Attempting to balance the interests of employers and employees, article L. 
120-2 of the French Labor Code authorizes employer restrictions on 
employee rights as long as the restriction is proportionate.330 This 
 323. ECHR, supra note 240, art. 8. 
 324. C. CIV., art. 9 (establishing that everyone has a right to privacy). 
 325. N.C.P.C., art. 9 (noting that each party is responsible for proving the necessary facts to 
establish their claims under the law). 
 326. C. TRAV., art L. 120-2 (prohibiting restrictions on personal rights and on individual and 
collective freedoms unless it is justified by the nature of the task to be accomplished and proportionate 
to the objectives achieved by the restriction). 
 327. Cass. soc., Dec. 11, 2001, 2001 Bull. Civ. V, No. 377; see also Waquet II, supra note 314, at 
7. 
 328. Cass. soc., Dec. 11, 2001, 2001 Bull. Civ. V, No. 377. 
 329. Id. 
 330. C. TRAV., art. L. 120-2. 
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balancing test approach is also taken by article 7(f) of Directive 95/46, the 
case law of the ECHR, and common law in the United States.331 
What is innovative about Nikon France is its application of the 
principle of proportionality. According to the European and American 
approaches, including French case law before Nikon France, an employer 
in the private sector may legally monitor the personal e-mail of employees 
sent during business hours as long as there is advance notice of the 
monitoring.332 This means that the interests of an employer prevailed so 
long as advance notice was given. The court in Nikon France, on the other 
hand, considered complete access to personal messages to be 
disproportionate. Thus, the decision prohibits an employer from having 
unlimited access to personal e-mail, unless exceptional circumstances 
exist,333 because personal e-mail is protected by the right of secrecy of 
correspondence, which forms a part of the right to privacy in the 
workplace during business hours.334 In this sense, Nikon France puts the 
interests of employee above those of an employer. 
In addition to its prohibition on unlimited e-mail access, Nikon France 
addressed one more facet of the principle of proportionality. In its 
decision, the court added that an employer cannot access personal 
messages even when they have prohibited the use of office computers for 
non-professional purposes.335 In Nikon France, the Attorney General of 
the Court of Cassation discussed in his conclusion (a final statement given 
as a recommendation of judgment that often influences the court’s 
decision) the impact of social change and the potential for dilution of the 
office/residence distinction.336 The Attorney General concluded that a total 
prohibition on computer use for non-professional purposes would be 
unrealistic.337 The French National Commission of Computers and 
Freedom issued a report in March 2001 reaching the same conclusion as 
 331. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 7(f); Halford v. United Kingdom, 1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 
1004 (1997); see supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text. 
 332. See supra Part III. 
 333. The Attorney General of the Court of Cassation suggests that the court will strictly interpret 
“exceptional circumstances,” because they are “the conditions extremely demanding.” Kehrig, supra 
note 317, at 8. 
 334. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, 2001 Bull Civ. V, No. 291, at 233–34. 
 335. Id. 
 336. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, 2001 Bull Civ. V, No. 291 (statement of the Attorney General), at 
http://www.courdecassation.fr/arrets/visu.cfm?num=1500 (last visited Feb. 2, 2005). 
 337. Id.; Kehrig, supra note 317, at 8. On the other hand, some commentators suggest that an 
employer could still introduce the total prohibition policy, in spite of the Attorney General’s statement. 
See, e.g., Ariane Mole, Débat autour de l’Arrêt Nikon France: Entretien [Debate around the Judgment 
of Nikon France: Interview], 1046 SEM. SOC. LAMY 12, 12 (2001). 
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the Attorney General.338 Given that an employee has a right to privacy 
even during business hours, the Attorney General in this case correctly 
stated that a total prohibition is disproportionate. Accordingly, after Nikon 
France, during business hours, an employer must tolerate modest 
computer use for non-professional purposes, including personal e-mail, 
and the employer cannot access that personal e-mail.339 
Under Nikon France, employers and employees must come to an 
accord in developing a monitoring policy that does not violate employee 
privacy.340 For example, employers and employees might agree on a 
policy that stipulates employees may use only free Web-based e-mail for 
personal communications, and that office e-mail addresses are to be used 
only for professional communications. Employers could then monitor 
communications sent through office e-mail addresses, and monitor the 
time employees spend on Web-based e-mail websites for their own 
productivity and employee discipline purposes. 
2. Corporate Scandals in the United States 
During the last few years, the United States suffered a series of 
corporate scandals in which U.S. companies committed major acts of 
accounting fraud. Two of the largest scandals involved Enron and 
WorldCom. 
Enron, a Houston company, was created in 1985 after Houston Natural 
Gas merged with InterNorth.341 Initially, Enron was doing business only in 
pipeline gas and power.342 However, Enron later expanded its projects 
beyond gas and power to take on business outside the United States.343 
Enron became a market-maker for energy-related products through a 
process of taking commissions from market participants.344 This strategy 
left Enron with an enormous debt that it did not want to disclose, as 
investors would lose their confidence in Enron and its stock price would 
 338. COMMISSION NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS [NATIONAL COMMISSION 
OF COMPUTERS AND FREEDOM], 21ÈME RAPPORT D’ACTIVITÉ: 2000 [21ST REPORT OF ACTIVITY: 
2000], 133 (2001). 
 339. This tolerance, inspired by the social changes, probably influenced the aforementioned 
application of the balancing test in Nikon France. 
 340. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, 2001 Bull Civ. V, No. 291, at 234. 
 341. Enron: Timeline, 1985: Founding Years, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ 
static/in_depth/business/2002/enron/timeline/1.stm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Enron: Timeline, 1990s: Market Making, BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/ 
static/in_depth/business/2002/enron/timeline/4.stm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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fall. If the stock price fell, the executives, who were also big shareholders, 
would lose substantial sums of money. 
In order to hide this red ink, Enron established a financial entity into 
which it transferred these debts.345 This enabled Enron to announce an 
inflated profit, thereby easing the anxiety of its investors. At the same 
time, the Enron executives sold their own stocks at the inflated prices.346 
Eventually, in 2001, Enron was forced to announce that it had committed 
accounting fraud, its stock price fell, and its employees lost their jobs.  
WorldCom essentially took the same path as Enron. WorldCom was a 
regional telecommunication company in the 1980s.347 As it rapidly grew 
and became international,348 it incurred a huge debt349 that it hid in the 
same manner as Enron.350 These scandals have generated public distrust of 
employers, corporate executives, and directors in the United States. This 
distrust of employers raises the following question: How can employers 
manage employees when the employers cannot manage themselves? In the 
context of e-mail monitoring, this question was translated into a suspicion 
that employers were abusing their authority in monitoring e-mails of 
employees. Such a suspicion gave the United States an opportunity to limit 
e-mail monitoring by employers; unfortunately, this opportunity was not 
one of which U.S. authorities took advantage. 
3. Comparative Prediction of the Future of Data Protection of 
Employees in the Private-Sector 
While Nikon France has no direct legal effect on EU member states 
other than France, it will likely lead to an indirect increase in the level of 
employee data protection due to the limits it suggests should be placed on 
e-mail monitoring. First, the Court of Cassation in Nikon France issued an 
interpretation of legal authority that binds (or mirrors) laws that are 
binding in other EU member states. In particular, the decision interpreted 
article 8 of the ECHR, article 9 of the French Civil Code, and article L. 
120-2 of the French Labor Code, all of which bind or mirror binding 
 345. Tom Fowler, The Pride and the Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2002, at A1, 
available at 2002 WL 23231814. 
 346. Enron’s Collapse: How Enron Fell: Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/business/20020115_enron_FALL/biz_enron_FALL_02.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 347. U.S. Telecoms Giant Admits Huge Fraud, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2002, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2066731.stm (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
 348. Id.  
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
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authority in other EU states.351 For example, article 8 of the ECHR, which 
guarantees a right to privacy, is operative in every member state of the 
European Union.352 Article 9 of the French Civil Code protects the privacy 
of individuals from invasion by other private parties.353 Directive 95/46 
similarly protects a private individual’s privacy from invasion by another 
through its application to the private-sector.354 Article 6(c) of Directive 
95/46 adopts the principle of proportionality in a fashion similar to article 
L. 120-2 of the French Labor Code.355 Furthermore, article 7(f) of 
Directive 95/46 parallels article L. 120-2 in its attempt to balance the 
interests of an employer and an employee in the workplace.356 Thus, the 
similarity of these substantive provisions indicates that interpretation of 
the legal principles in Directive 95/46 may parallel the interpretation by 
the French court. 
Second, key to this prediction is the recognition of a right to privacy in 
the workplace. In Nikon France, the Court of Cassation recognized an 
employee’s right to privacy in the workplace during business hours. This 
right to privacy in the workplace, along with other social changes, has 
driven an innovative application of the balancing of employer and 
employee interests. Like France, Western Europe, in general, has tended to 
recognize the right to privacy in the workplace, and the social changes 
mentioned by the Attorney General of the Court of Cassation are to be 
found across Western Europe.357 
Thus, the courts in other member states of the European Union would 
likely reach the same analysis as that employed in Nikon France. These 
courts would thus conclude that an employer may monitor personal e-mail 
only under exceptional circumstances, and that a violation of this rule 
 351. Cass. soc., Oct. 2, 2001, Bull Civ. V, No. 291, at 233–34. 
 352. ECHR, supra note 240, art. 8. 
 353. C. CIV., art. 9. 
 354. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 3. 
 355. Id. art. 6(c); C. TRAV., art. L. 120-2. 
 356. Directive 95/46, supra note 11, art. 7(f). 
 357. The Article 29 Working Party of the European Union, aware of the right to privacy in the 
workplace and the social changes mentioned in Nikon France, interprets the principle of 
proportionality to mean that employers should always process personal data in the least intrusive 
manner possible, while considering the risks at stake, the amount of data involved, the purpose of the 
processing, etc. ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, supra note 87, at 21. This interpretation requires a 
strict application of the proportionality to a particular situation. Thus, negotiations into the 
representatives of workers on the method of surveillance and the usage of “new technologies” is 
inevitable under the European Data Protection Directive. Olivier Rijkaert, Cyber Surveillance des 
Salaríes: l’Étau Se Resserse Suite á Un Arrêt de Cassation Francais [Cyber Surveillances of 
Employees: Tightens After a Judgment of French Supreme Court], Oct. 15, 2001, at http://www.droit-
technologie.org/1_2.asp?actu-id=471 (last visited Nov. 17, 2004). 
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justifies sanctioning the employer. Additionally, given the greater role that 
the government in Western Europe tends to play, it is possible that 
Western European countries will limit e-mail monitoring legislatively. 
Conversely, the United States is unlikely to increase the protection of 
employee privacy in the private-sector despite the opportunity to do so that 
was presented by U.S. corporate scandals. Because the United States does 
not accord the right to privacy as high a status as Western European 
countries, courts in the United States are unlikely to apply the balancing 
test in the same way as the Court of Cassation did in Nikon France. In 
other words, the interests of an employer will continue to prevail over 
those of an employee. It is also unlikely that the United States will 
legislate greater data protection for private-sector employees. The 
government is reluctant to intervene in private-party relationships and any 
attempt to intervene would encounter the strong resistance of lobbyists, 
financed by employers who oppose the increased costs associated with a 
greater level of data protection.358 In addition, before any legislation to 
increase protection of employer privacy was enacted, public outrage 
against employers—the only force likely to overcome the powerful 
lobbyists working against such legislation—was quickly replaced by 
public outrage against the terrorists who perpetrated the tragedy of 
September 11, 2001. 
In summary, in Western Europe, the level of data protection of private-
sector employees is likely to increase in the future. In contrast, the level of 
protection will likely stay the same in the United States. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Western Europe and the United States have each built data protection 
schemes around a legislative source: Directive 95/46 and the ECPA, 
respectively. Case law at the European level allows an employer, in some 
circumstances, to monitor employee e-mail. The exceptions to the ECPA 
and the common law show that the United States presently reaches a result 
similar to that in Western Europe. However, following Nikon France, 
Western Europe is likely to protect data privacy and increasingly limit e-
mail monitoring because of the greater value that Western Europe places 
on the right to privacy and the greater role Western European governments 
play as a guarantor of citizens’ rights. On the other hand, in the United 
States, society is skeptical of governmental intervention and the status of 
 358. Charlesworth, supra note 13, at 83. 
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the right to privacy is lower than in Western Europe. Corporate scandals 
spread fear of employers abusing their authority and may have provided a 
significant opportunity to increase employee privacy. This opportunity, 
however, appears to have passed, and the level of data protection in the 
United States will likely remain the same in the future. 
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